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In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho 
WASHINGTON FEDERAL SAVINGS, a 




Supreme Court Docket No. 38484-2011 
Ada County District Court No. 
2009-17209 
H. CRAIG VAN ENGELEN and KRISTEN 
VAN ENGELEN, Ret: No. 12-111 
Defendants-Appellants. 
A REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE wilh attachments, a MOTION TO AUGMENT THE 
RECORD with attachments, an APPLICATION TO VACATE STAY IMPOSED BY THE 
DISTRICT COURT and a BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF APPLICATION TO VACATE STAY 
IMPOSED BY THE DISTRICT COURT with attachments, were filed by counsel fOT Respondent on 
March 7, 2012. Thereafter, a RESPONSE TO MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD, 
REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE, AND APPLICATION TO VACATE STAY, with 
atta<:hments, was filed by counsel for Appellant. on March 23, 2012. Subsequently, 
WASHINGTON FEDERAL'S REPLY TO VAN ENGELEN'S RESPONSE TO MOTION TO 
AUGMENT THE RECORD, REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE, AND APPLICATION TO 
VACATE STAY was med by counsel for Respondent on April 2, 2012. This Court is fully advised; 
therefore. good cause appearing. 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that the REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE be, and hereby is, 
GRANTED and this Court sball take judicial notice of the documents listed below, copies of which 
accompanied the Request for Judicial Notice and placed with the EXHlBITS for the convenience of 
the Court: 
I. Order Granting Motioo to Stay Execution as to Plaintiff s Rights in this Action Against 
Defendants, Ada County case no. CV OC 0809440, fil..stamped June 10,2010 and 
Minute Entry dated June 9, 201 0; 
2. Order Granting Application to Vacate Stay, Supreme Court docket no. 37060, dated 
SepteTnber 22, 201 0; 
3. Order Denying Application for Stay, Supreme Court docket no. 37060, dated January 31, 
2011; 
- Docket No. 38484-2011 
4. Certificate of Sale on Personal Property Sold Under Second Writ of Execution, Ada 
County case no. CVOC0809440, dated February 10,2011; 
S. Sheriff's Return on Second Writ of Execution, Ada County case no. CVOC0809440, 
file-stamped February 16,201 1; 
6. Order Granting Motion to Dismiss. Supreme Court docket no. 37060, dated March 8, 
2011; 
7. Remittitur, Supreme Court docket no. 37060, dated April 6, 2011 and file-stamped April 
15, 2011 by the district court; and 
8. Memorandum Decision on Post-Judgment Motions, Madison County case no. 
CV-I0-680, file-stamped August 31, 2011. 
IT FURTHER rs ORDERED that Respondent's MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD 
be, and hereby is, GRANTED and the augmentation record shall include the documents listed below, 
tile stamped copies of which accompanied this Motion: 
I. Writ of Execution, dated May 12, 2011 ; 
2. Notice ofSherifPs Sale, dated June 20, 2011; 
3. Motion to Waive RequiIement of Supersedeas Bond and Stay Execution and/or 
Eofon:ement of the Judgrnent, file-stamped July 6, 2011; 
4. Affidavit of H. Craig Van Engelen in Support of Motion to Waive Requirement of 
Supmedeas Bond and Stay Execution andlor EoforceTnent of the Judgment, file-stamped 
July 6, 2011 ; 
S. Order Staying Execution on Van Engelens' Appeal Rights, file-stamped September 14, 
20\! ; and 
6. Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Plaintiff'. Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Waive 
RequireTOent of Supersedeas Bond and Stay Execution andlor Enforcement of the 
Judgment, file-stamped July 15,2011. 
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that Appellant'S REQUEST TO AUGMENT THE RECORD 
be, and hereby is, GRANTED and the augmentation record shall include the documents listed below, 
me stamped copies of which accompanied this Motion: 
1. Plaintiff's Motion Contesting Defendants' Clalm of Exemption, file-stamped June 28, 
2011; 
2. MeTnorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion Contesting Defendants' Claim of 
EXeTnption, file-stamped June 28, 2011; 
3. Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion Contesting Claim of Exemption, file-stamped July I, 
2011; 
4. Affidavit of Counsel in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion Contesting Claim of Exemption, 
with attachments, file-stamped July I, 201 1; 
S. Memorandum in Support of Motion to Waive Requirement ofSuper.tedeas Bond and Stay 
Execution andIor Enfon:ement of the Judgment, file-stamped July 6, 2011; 
6. Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Waive Requirement of 
Supmedeas Bond and Stay Execution and/or Enforcement of the Judgrnent, flied July 15, 
2011 ; 
7. Reply in Support of Defendant's Motion to Waive Requirement of Supersedeas Bond and 
Stay Executioo and/or Enforcement of the judgrnen~ file-stamped July 22, 20 II ; and . 
LAW CLERK 
8. Supplemental Authority in Support of the Van Engelens' Motion to Wah 
Bond and/or Enfon:eTnent of the ludgmen, file-stamped September 2, 201 
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED thai Respondent's APPLICATION TO VA 
IMPOSED BY THE DISTRICT COURT be, and hereby is, DENIED. 
j!. 
DATED thiS~daY of April, 2012. 
cc: 
j"j,te en 
Counsel of Record {-
District Court Judie Cheri Copsey 
NTA 
ORDER - Docket No. 38484-201l 
In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho 
WASHINGTON FEDERAL SAVINGS, a 















Supreme Court Docket No. 38484-2011 
Ada County District Court No. 
2009-17209 
H. CRAIG V AN ENGELEN and KRISTEN 
VAN ENGELEN, Ref: No. 12-111 
Defendants-Appellants. 
A REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE with attachments, a MOTION TO AUGMENT THE 
RECORD with attachments. an APPLICATION TO VACATE STAY IMPOSED BY THE 
DISTRICT COURT and a BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF APPLICATION TO VACATE STAY 
IMPOSED BY THE DISTRICT COURT with attachments, were filcd by cOWlSel for Respondent on 
March 7, 2012. Thereafter, a RESPONSE TO MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD, 
REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE, AND APPLICATION TO VACATE STAY, with 
attachments, was filed by counsel for Appellants on March 23, 2012. Subsequently, 
WASHINGTON FEDERAL'S REPLY TO VAN ENGELEN'S RESPONSE TO MOTION TO 
AUGMENT THE RECORD, REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE, AND APPLICATION TO 
VACATE STAY was filed by counsel for Respondent on April 2, 2012. This Court is fully advised; 
therefore, good cause appearing. 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that the REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE be, and hereby is, 
GRANTED and this Court shall take judicial notice of the documents listed below, copies of which 
accompanied the Request for Judicial Notice and placed with the EXHIBITS for the convenience of 
the Court: 
1. Order Granting Motion to Stay Execution as to Plaintiff's Rights in this Action Against 
Defendants, Ada County case no. CV OC 0809440, file-stamped June 10,2010 and 
Minute Entry dated Junc 2010; 
2. Order Granting Application to Vacate Stay, Court docket no. 37060, dated 
September 22,2010; 
3. Order Denying Application for Stay, Supreme Court docket no. 37060, dated January 31, 
2011; 
ORDER - Docket No. 38484-2011 
4. Certificate of Sale on Sold Writ of Execution, Ada 
County case no. CVOC0809440, February 1 2011; 
5. Sheriffs Return on Writ of Execution, County case no. CVOC0809440, 
file-stamped February 16,2011; 
6. Order Granting Motion to Supreme Court docket no. 37060, dated March 8, 
2011; 
7. Remittitur, Supreme Court docket no. 37060, dated April 6, 2011 and file-stamped April 
15,2011 by the district court; and 
8. Memorandum Decision on Madison County case no. 
CV -1 0~680, file-stamped August 31, 2011. 
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that TO AUGMENT THE RECORD 
be, and hereby is, GRANTED the au~mem:allon record include the documents listed below, 
file stamped copies of which accompanied this Motion: 
1. Writ of Execution, dated 12, 2011; 
2. Notice of Sheriffs dated June 20, 2011; 
3. Motion to Waive Supersedeas and Stay Execution andlor 
Enforcement of the file-stamped July 2011; 
4. Affidavit of H. Craig in Support Motion to Waive Requirement 
Supersedeas Bond and Stay andlor of the Judgment, file-stamped 
July 6,2011; 
5. Order on Van Engelens' file-stamped September 14, 
2011; and 
6. Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Waive 
Requirement of Supersedeas Bond and Stay Execution andlor Enforcement of the 
Judgment, file-stamped July 15,2011. 
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that Appellant's REQUEST TO AUGMENT THE RECORD 
be, and hereby is, GRANTED and the augmentation record shall include the documents listed below, 
file stamped copies of which accompanied this Motion: 
1. Plaintiffs Motion Contesting Defendants' Claim of Exemption, file-stamped June 28, 
2011; 
2. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion Contesting Defendants' Claim of 
Exemption, file-stamped June 28, 2011; 
3. Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion Contesting Claim of Exemption. file-stamped July I, 
2011; 
4. Affidavit ofCounse1 in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion Contesting Claim of Exemption, 
with attachments. file-stamped July 1, 2011; 
5. Memorandum in of Motion to Waive Requirement of Supersedeas Bond and Stay 
Execution and/or Judgment, file-stamped july 6,2011; 
6. Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Waive Requirement of 
Supersedeas Bond and Stay Execution and/or Enforcement of the Judgment, flIed July 15, 
2011; 
7. Reply in Support of Defendant's Motion to Waive Requirement of Supersedeas Bond and 
Stay Execution andlor Enforcement of the Judgment, file-stamped July 22,2011; and 
ORDER - Docket No. 38484-2011 
8. Supplemental Authority in Support of the Van Engelens' Monon to Waive Supersedeas 
Bond and/or Enforcement of the Judgment, file-stamped September 2, 2011. 
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that Respondent's APPLICATION TO VACATE STAY 
IMPOSED BY THE DISTRICT COURT be, and hereby is, DENIED. 
DATED this --=_ day of April, 2012. 
cc: Counsel of Record 
District Court Judge 





David E. Wishney, LS.B # 1993 
Chad E. Bernards, LS.B. #7441 
Attorney and Counselor at Law 
988 S. Longmont, Ste. 100 
P.O. Box 837 
Boise, ID 83701 
Telephone: (208) 336-5955 
Facsimile: (208) 336-5956 
Attorneys for Washington Federal Savings 
J 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL OISTRlCT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
WASHINGTON FEDERAL SAVINGS, 


















CASE NO. CV OC 09-17209 
WRIT OF EXECUTION 
TO: THE SHERIFF OF ADA COUNTY, STATE OF IDAHO, GREETINGS: 
WHEREAS, on the 14th day of December, 2010, the Plaintiff above named recovered 
a money Judgment and on the 27th day of January, 2011, recovered an Amended Judgment, 
in the above entitled Court against the Defendants H. Craig Van Engelen and Kristen Van 
EngeIen, above named for the: 
TOTAL SUM OF: 
Amount paid by Defendant or by Execution: 
BALANCE: 
Plus Accruing Interest: 
Plus Accruing Costs: 
\VRIT OF EXECUTION - Page 1 





AMOUNT DUE AND OWING: $ 5,148,304.26 .. 
NOW, YOU, THE SAID SHERIFF are hereby requested to satisfy said Judgment, 
with interest at the legal rate, plus accruing costs, and Sheriffs fees out of the personal 
property of said Defendants or if sufficient personal property of said Defendants cannot be 
found, then out of the real property belonging to the said Defendants, and make return of this 
Writ within sixty (60) days after receipt hereof with what you have done endorsed thereon. 
WITNESS, my hand and the seal of the said Court, this L ~1Y of May, 2011. 
., . ~ 
",.';"" ••••••• r:;:,';;:;' ~"i/ #, ..,., c; .... . 
",,1''0 FOR ~ \) ~ " .... .. 
'f .......... ,' 
WRIT OF EXECUTION - Page 2 
David E. Wishney, I.S.B. #1993 
Chad E. Bernards, I.S.B. #7441 
Attorney and Counselor at Law 
988 S. Longmont, Ste. 100 
P.O. Box 837 
Boise,ID 83701 
Telephone: (208) 336-5955 
Facsimile: (208) 336-5956 
Attorneys for Washington Federal Savings 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
WASHINGTON FEDERAL SAVINGS, ) 
a United States corporation, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs, ) CASE NO. CV OC 09-17209 
) 
vs. ) 
) NOTICE OF SHERIFF'S SALE 






Under and by virtue of a money judgment rendered out of the above-captioned Court, 
which Judgment was entered on the 14th day of December, 2010, and the Writ of Execution 
being issue on the 12TH day Of...!.!Me::..lay'---_, 2011, in the above-captioned action, wherein the 
above-named Plaintiff Washington Federal Savings obtained a money judgment against the 
above-named Defendants H. Craig Van Engelen and Kristen Van Engelen, jointly and 
NOTICE OF SHERIFF'S SALE - Page 1 
severally, for the sum of $4,996,10 1.65, together with an award ofattomey's fees and cost 
for the sum of$40,897.21, together with post judgment interest in the amount of$111,303.40 
being calculated at the statutory rate of 5.375% from December 14,2010 through May 10, 
2011, for a total sum of $5,148,302.26, together with accruing interests and costs, all of 
which are to be satisfied out of the proceeds of the claims, causes of action, choses in action, 
defenses and/or affirmative defenses, rights to appeal, and all rights, title, and interest held 
by Defendants H. Craig Van Engelen and Kristen Van Engelen in the litigation of 
Washington Federal Savings, a United States corporation vs. H. Craig Van Engelen and 
Kristen Van Engelen, Case No. CV 09-17209 in the District Court of the Fourth Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada, including any interest in the 
appeal of the foregoing litigation, specifically, any and all rights, title, and interest held by 
H. Craig Van Engelen and Kristen Van Engelen in the matter known as Washington Federal 
Savings, a United States corporation vs. H. Craig Van Engelen and Kristen Van Engelen, 
Idaho Supreme Court Docket No. 38484-2011. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN, that on Thursday ,the 7TH day of 
------~---------
___ J_u_l_y ________ , 2011, at _9_:3_0 ____ o'clock a.m./~ of said day at the steps of the 
Public Safety Building located at 7200 Barrister Drive, Boise, Idaho 83704, I will in 
obedience to said Order, and Writ Of Execution, levy upon the claims, causes of action, 
choses in action, defenses and/or affirmative defenses, rights to appeal, and all rights, title, 
and interest held by Defendants H. Craig Van Engelen and Kristen Van Engelen in the 
NOTICE OF SHERIFF'S SALE - Page 2 
() 
. litIgation of Washington Federal Savings, a United States corporation vs. H. Craig Van 
Engelen and Kristen Van Engelen, Case No. CV 09-17209 in the District Court of the Fourth 
Judicial District of the State ofIdaho, in and for the County of Ada, including any interest 
in the appeal of the foregoing litigation, specifically, any and all rights, title, and interest held 
by H. Craig Van Engelen and Kristen Van Engelen in the matter known as Washington 
Federal Savings, a United States corporation vs. H. Craig Van Engelen and Kristen Van 
Engelen, Idaho Supreme Court Docket No. 38484-2011, to satisfY the above-referenced 
money judgment, together with all interest thereon and costs of sale. 
June 
DATED THIS 20TH day of Mtty, 2011. 
_G_AR_y_RAN_E_y __________ , Sheriff 
Ada County, State of Idaho 
By: -~IE~' ··' ..... i~lU.~rL....L...>~~-..fA"_'_')£.--­
Deputy Sheriff 
NOTICE OF SHERIFF'S SALE - Page 3 
Thomas A. Banducci (ISB No. 24~3) 
tbanducci@bwslawgrollP·com 
Wade L. Woodard (ISB No. 6312) 
wwoodard@bwslawgroup.com 
Dara Parker (ISB No. 7177) 
dparker@bwslawgroup.com 
Banducci Woodard Schwartzman PLLC 
802 W. Bannock St., Suite 500 
Boise, ID 83702 
Telephone: (208) 342-4411 
Facsimile: (208) 342-4455 
Attorneys for Defendants 
JUl 06 2011 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By JERI HEATON 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
WASHINGTON FEDERAL SAVINGS, a 
United States Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
H. CRAIG VAN ENGELEN and KRISTEN 
V AN ENGELEN, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-OC 0917209 
MOTION TO WAIVE REQUIREMENT 
OF SUPERSEDEAS BOND AND STAY 
EXECUTION AND/OR ENFORCEMENT 
OF THE JUDGMENT 
Defendants H. Craig Van Engelen and Kristen Van Engelen move the Court to waive the 
requirement of a supersedeas bond and stay execution andlor enforcement of the judgment 
pending appeal. This motion is made pursuant to Idaho Code § 13-202 and Idaho Appellate Rule 
13(b), and is supported by the affidavit of Kristen Van Engelen and a Memorandum in Support, 
filed contemporaneously herewith. In addition, as requested in a contemporaneously filed 
Motion to Shorten time, it is requested that this Court shorten time so that this motion may be 
MOTION TO W AlVE REQUIRENfENT OF SUPERSEDEAS BOND AND STAY EXECUTION AND/OR 
ENFORCEMENT OF THE JUDGMENT - 1 
ORfGI~JAL 
heard at the hearing presently scheduled on related issue for July 7, 2011, at the hour of 3 :00 
p.m. 
DATED this 6th day of July 2011. 
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC 
MOTION TO W AlVE REQUIREMENT OF SUPERSEDEAS BOND AND STAY EXECUTION AND/OR 
ENFORCEMENT OF THE JUDGMENT - 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 6th day of July, 2011, a true and correct copy of the 
within and foregoing instrument was served upon: 
David E. Wishney 
Attorney and Counselor at Law 
988 S. Longmont, Ste. 100 
P.O. Box 837 
Boise, ID 83701 
o U.S. Mail 
rg] Facsimile (208) 336-5956 
o Hand Delivery o Overnight Delivery 
MOTION TO WAIVE REQUIREMENT OF SUPERSEDEAS BOND AND STAY EXECUTION AND/OR 
ENFORCEMENT OF THE JUDGMENT - 3 
... "f~~g.e: j ~3. • Date: 71612011 1'. ::M' : .. , v.,.. "'LED, '~'"bL 
Thomas A. Banducci (ISB No. 2453) 
tbanducCi@bwslawgroup.com 
Wade L. Woodard (ISB No. 6312) 
wwoodard@bwslawgroup.com 
Dara Parhr (TSB No. 7177) 
dparker@bws/awgrollp. com 
Banducci Woodard Schwartzman PLLC 
802 W. Bannock St., Suite 500 
Boise, ID 83702 
Telephone: (208) 342-4411 
facsimile: (208) 342-4455 
Attorneys for Defendants 
. - P.M'~ ----t""'--=-__ 
JUl 06 2011 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH CI k 
By JERI HEATON ' er 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR Tl-IE COUNTY or ADA 
WASHINGTON FEDERAL SAVINGS, a 
United States Corporation. 
Plaintiff. 
vs. 
H. CRAIG VAN ENGELEN and KRlSTEN 
VAN ENGELEN. 
Case No. CV-OC 0917209 
AFFlDAVIT OF H. CRAIG VAN ENGELEN 
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO WAIVE 
REQUIREMENT OF SUPERSEDEAS BOND 
AND STAY EXECUTION ANDIOR 
ENFORCEMENT OF THE JUDGMENT 
l Defendants. I ,.",,", ___ ._" _ ----l....-__ _ 
County ()f_ ) 
): ss 
State of Texas ) 
r, H. Craig Van Engclcn, first being duly sworn. subscribe and state as fol1ows: 
1. I make this affidavit upon my personal knowledge. 
2. I am a Defendant in the above-title action. 
AFFlDA VIT OF II. CRAIG VAN ENGRLEN - 1 
This fax was received by GFI FAXmaker fax server. For more information. visit: http:J~iW"gfi.com 
JA ".r:a.9.e: ~3. • Date: 7/612011 1 
3. ~f)' wife Kristen Van EngeIen and I are requesting a waiver from the Court of the 
requirement t() post a supersedeas bond and an order staying execution of the judgment during 
the pendency or the appeal. 
4. The judgment in this case was $5,036,998.86. My understanding of Idaho law i~ 
that a supersedeas bond which would have stayed execution requires posting or a supersedeas 
hond in the amount orlhe judgment plus 36% of such amount, for a total bond of $6,850,318.26 
5. My wife und I were employed as land developers for decades. Thc economic 
do"vnturn destroyed our business. 
6. In addition to the $6 mIllion debt owed to Washington Federal Savings which is at 
issllc in tl1is lawsuit, we owed approximately $2 milJjon 10 M()unLain WeSl Bank, $1 million to 
Home Federal Bank, and at least $! 3 million to Bank of the Cascades. We were engaged in 
litigation in litigation with .Mountain West Bank and Home Federal Bank. but acknowledge that 
\ve had valid personal guara.ntees \vith those barlk~1 and \verc able to ~etde by tran::ferring many 
of our remaining business asset~. The $13 million debt to Bunk of the Cascades is still 
()ut~tanding. 
7. In addition to these liabilities, we have liabilities for other debts in an amount 
exceeding $1 million. 
S. OUT liabilities far exceed our very limited remaining assets, 
9, OUf income has been devastated by the economic downturn. We have had no 
positive income (and In fact, substantial negative income) for the past fivc years. 
, 10. Given our financial condition, we knew we would be unable to qualify for a 
supersedeas bond in the amount () r $6,850,3 J 8.26. 
APFIDA VIT OP H. CRAIG V Al'l ENGELEN • 2 
This fax was received by GFI FAXmaker fax server. For more information. visit http://wNw.gfi.com 
11. Given our financial condition, we were also unable to post a cash deposit to cover 
the $5,036,998.86 judgment 
DATED this Cr. day of July. 2011. 
--'-'-'-"'-' ---_._ ... __ ._-_ ....... _-_._ .. _--
H. Craig Van Engelen 
SUBSCRTBED AND SWORN before me thisG, ~ay ofJuJy 2011 
AFFTDA VIT OF H. CRAIG V/\N ENGELEN - 3 
ThiS fax was received by GFI FAXmaker fax server. For more information, visit: http://www.gfLcom 
t • 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 6th day of July, 2011, a true and correct copy of the 
within and foregoing instrument was served upon: 
David E. Wishney 
Attorney and Counselor at Law 
988 S. Longmont, Ste. 100 
P.O. Box 837 
Boise, ID 83701 
AFFIDAVIT OF H. CRAIG V AN ENGELEN - 4 
o U.S. Mail 
~ Facsimile (208) 336-5956 


































\4g:~ __ _ 
SEP 1 4 2011 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By LUCILIlfr~ANSEREAU 
DEPUTY 
THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
WASHINGTON FEDERAL SAVINGS, 
Plaintiff, Case No. CV-OC-2009-17209 
vs. ORDER STAYING EXECUTION ON 
VAN ENGELENS' APPEAL RIGHTS 
H. CRAIG VAN ENGELEN AND 
KRISTIN L. V AN ENGELEN, 
Defendants. 
On November 12, 2010, the Court granted Washington Federal Savings' Motion for 
Summary Judgment against H. Craig and Kristen Van Engelen (collectively "Van Engelens"), 
finding that as guarantors, the Van Engelens were contractually obligated to Washington Federal 
("the Bank"). On December 14, 2010, the Court entered a money judgment against the Van 
Engelens in the amount of $4,996,101.65. The Bank moved for costs and attorney fees. The Court 
granted attorneys fees and costs. The Court entered an Amended Judgment in the amount of 
$5,036,998.86 on January 27, 2011, including costs and fees. On January 25, 2011, the Van 
Engelens filed a Notice of Appeal. 
Prior to filing the Notice of Appeal, on December 16, 2010, the Van Engelens requested 
the Bank waive the supersedeas bond requirement and the Bank refused. 
On May 12,2011, the Court issued a Writ of Execution. The Bank then instructed the Ada 
County Sheriff to levy upon and sell all claims, causes of action, choses in action, defenses, 
affirmative defenses, rights to appeal, and all rights, title, and interest held by the Van Engelens. 
The Sheriff set the execution sale for July 7, 2011. On June 21, 2011, the Van Engelens filed a 
Claim of Exemption and Supplemental Claim of Exemption claiming that their appeal rights were 
exempt from levy. They also alleged that they were financially unable to post a supersedeas bond 
in the amount required under the appellate rule, I.A.R. 13(b)(15). 
ORDER STAYING EXECUTION ON APPEAL RIGHTS 
































On June 28, 2011, the Bank contested the Van Engelens' claim of exemption. On July 6, 
2011, the Van Engelens moved the Court to waive any requirement for a supersedeas bond and 
stay execution. The Court heard argument on July 7, 2011. 
After hearing argument, the Court ordered additional briefing. More specifically, the Court 
ordered the parties to address any due process or other constitutional claims that might be 
implicated by the Bank's execution on the Van Engelens' appeal rights and subsequent dismissal 
of their appeal. 
The parties filed additional briefing, and the Court heard argument on September 1, 2011, 
and took the matter under advisement. 
For the reasons stated below, the Court finds that in Idaho, because parties have a statutory 
right to appeal pursuant to I.C. § 13-101, the constitutional requirements of due process and equal 
protection apply to the exercise of that right. Dowd v. United States ex reI. Cook, 340 U.S. 206 
(1951). Therefore, the Court finds that allowing a judgment creditor (the Bank) to purchase the 
judgment debtor's (the Van Engelens) right to appeal the very judgment giving rise to the debt, 
effectively permits the judgment creditor to deny the debtor his statutory right to appeal without 
due process. Based on the Court's ruling, the Court stays the Bank's right to execute on the Van 
Engelens' right to appeal only. The Court does not stay the Bank's right to execute against any 
other of the Van Engelens' rights or property absent the Van Engelens posting a proper 
supersedeas bond pursuant to I.A.R. 13(b)(15). 
ANALYSIS 
This is a matter of first impression in Idaho.l In a nutshell, the Bank contends that the Van 
Engelens' appellate rights are simply another chose in action that can be purchased at an 
execution sale by the judgment creditor (the Bank) in that same action. Once the Bank purchases 
the Van Engelens' appeal right, the Bank intends to dismiss their appeal. While initially arguing 
that someone other than the Bank would be interested in purchasing the Van Engelens' right to 
appeal this Court's decision at an execution sale, during oral argument the Bank conceded those 
appeal rights have no value to anyone other than the Bank or the Van Engelens. Clearly, no one 
I While the Idaho Supreme Court denied a Motion for Stay in another case, the order was simply entered by the Clerk 
of the Supreme Court without opinion. 
ORDER STAYING EXECUTION ON APPEAL RIGHTS 































would be interested in purchasing the right to appeal a substantial judgment, thus becoming 
potentially liable for that same judgment. On appeal the most any such purchaser could obtain 
even if successful was relieJfrom paying the $5,000,000 judgment. Therefore, these appeal rights 
have no value to anyone other than the Van Engelens and the Bank and the Court finds that the 
only reason the Bank would purchase the appeal rights was to extinguish the Van Engelens' right 
to appeal that judgment. 
Due to the economic times, this practice has been increasingly used to abrogate a party's 
right to appeal specific court decisions. Once the appeal rights are purchased for a minimal 
amount, any appeal is then dismissed by the new owner of the appeal right - in these cases, the 
successful party to the same litigation. Especially in cases like this one where a guarantee is at the 
heart of the cause of action and a substantial judgment has been entered, the judgment debtor (the 
losing party) may not have the funds for a cash deposit or the ability to obtain a supersedeas bond 
meeting the appellate rule requirements to stay execution on his appeal rights. See LA.R. 13 
(b )(15)(requiring the bond be in the amount of the judgment plus 36%). Therefore, since the 
current appellate rule grants no discretion to modify the requirement for a bond or cash deposit 
even Jar good cause, a judgment debtor in this situation effectively loses his right to appeal the 
very decision creating the judgment without any meaningful process. 
However, where, as here, the court does not stay execution against a judgment debtor's 
other property without posting a proper bond or cash deposit, a judgment creditor's rights are 
nonetheless protected while still recognizing a party's right to appeal. The Bank can still execute 
against any other property owned by the Van Engelens. 
A. The right to appeal is a statutory right. 
As a matter of due process, no one has a constitutional right to an appeal. McKane v. 
Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687 (1894). Neither Federal nor Idaho Constitutions provides a blanket 
right to an appeal. Abney v. U.S. 431 U.S. 651,656 (1997), State v. Moran-Soto, 150 Idaho 175, 
244 P.3d 1261 (Ct. App. 2010). At the time of the adoption of the Idaho constitution, however, a 
complete system of appeals was a part of the law. The Idaho Constitution specifically requires the 
legislature to provide a system of appeal. Art. 5 § 13, provides in relevant part as follows: 
The legislature shall have no power to deprive the judicial department of any 
power or jurisdiction which rightly pertains to it as a coordinate department of the 
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government; but the legislature shall provide a proper system of appeal, and 
regulate by law, when necessary, the methods of proceeding in the exercise of their 
powers of all the courts below the Supreme Court, so far as the same may be done 
without conflict with this Constitution. 
(Emphasis added.) Thus, the right to appeal, time for taking appeals, and requirements for appeal 
have always been an area reserved by the constitution to the legislature for change or 
modification. See Weiser Irr. Dist. v. Middle Valley, etc., Co., 28 Idaho 548, 552, 155 P. 484, _ 
(1916). 
The right to appeal, procedures involved, time for appeals, and all other associated 
processes are presently governed by Idaho Code Title 13, Chs. 1 and 2.2 As the Idaho Supreme 
Court observed in Dolbeer v. Harten, 91 Idaho 141, 148, 417 P.2d 407, 414 (1965) "[i]t is of 
interest to note that Title 13, Ch. 1 and all of Ch. 2, (except I.C. § 13-222), were first enacted in 
188l." In other words, the right to appeal has been long established in Idaho? 
Once an appellate procedure is provided by a state, such procedure must meet the 
constitutional requirements of due process and equal protection. Dowd v. United States ex rel. 
Cook, 340 U.S. 206, 208 (1951). 
B. Requiring an appellant to post a bond or cash deposit in order to exercise his 
right to appeal as set forth in I.A.R. 13(b)(lS) violates due process. 
On their face, the Idaho appellate rules do not grant any discretion to either the District 
Court or the Supreme Court to stay execution or enforcement of a money judgment on appeal 
absent the filing of a supersedeas bond or a cash deposit. LA.R. 13(b)(15) and (16) provide, in 
relevant part, as follows: 
b) Stay Upon Appeal--Powers of District Court--Civil Actions. In civil actions, 
unless prohibited by order of the Supreme Court, the district court shall have the 
power and authority to rule upon the following motions and to take the following 
actions during the pendency on an appeal; ... 
(15) Stay execution or enforcement of a money judgment upon the posting 
of a cash deposit or supersedeas bond by a fidelity, surety, guaranty, title or trust 
2 I.C. § 13-201 provides as follows: "An appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court from a district court in any civil 
action by such parties from such orders and judgments, and within such times and in such manner as prescribed by 
Rule of the Supreme Court." 
3 As discussed below, not all states recogniz:e a right to appeal which affects the way such jurisdictions address this 
situation. 
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company authorized to do business in the state and to be a surety on undertakings 
and bonds, either of which must be in the amount of the judgment or order, plus 
36% of such amount . ... 
(16) Any order of the Supreme Court as to whether or not a judgment, 
order, decree or proceeding shall be stayed shall take precedence over any order 
entered by the district court. 
(Emphasis added.) Given that appeal rights are property4 and are subject to execution,S the Court 
is without authority under the Rule to stay execution of that property unless the appellant posts the 
requisite bond or cash deposit. 
However, the statute authorizing the Supreme Court to adopt rules addressing stays on 
appeal, I.e. § 13-202, provides, in relevant part, as follows: 
(1) Upon and after an appeal of a judgment or order of the district court in a civil 
action, the judgment or order appealed from, or any other order or proceeding in 
the action may be stayed by the district court or the supreme court as provided by 
rule of the supreme court. 
(2) If a plaintiff in a civil action obtains a judgment for punitive damages, the 
supersedeas bond or cash deposit requirements shall be waived as to that portion 
of the punitive damages that exceeds one million dollars ($1,000,000) if the party 
or parties found liable seek a stay of enforcement of the judgment during the 
appeal. 
*** 
(4) The supersedeas bond or cash deposit requirements may also be waived in any 
action for good cause shown as provided by rule of the supreme court. 
I.e. § 13-202 (emphasis added). The legislature clearly intended that the court have the discretion 
to waive the requirement that an appellant post bond or cash deposit for good cause. 
The Idaho Appellate Rules, however, do not allow any discretion even though the enacting 
legislation, subsection (4), clearly anticipates they would. In fact, the Idaho Appellate Rules do 
4 Idaho law recognizes that a "thing in action" or "chose in action" is included within the definition of "personal 
property". See e.g. I.C. § 73-114(2)(c) (personal property includes "things in action"). Idaho Law recognizes that 
"things in action" are transferable. See I.e. § 55-402 (Transfer and Devolution of Things in Action). 
5 Idaho Code § 11-201 governs a writ of execution on a judgment: 
PROPERTY LIABLE TO SEIZURE - All goods, chattels, moneys and other property, both real 
and personal, or any interest therein of the judgment debtor, not exempt by law, and property and 
rights of property, seized and held under attachment in the action, are liable to execution. 
(Emphasis added); see also I.C. § 11-301 (Execution of Writ). 
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not incorporate subsection (2) specifically requiring that any supersedeas bond or cash deposit be 
waived for punitive damages in excess of $1,000,000. 
As the Supreme Court recently observed, ordinarily, the right to appeal, as well as many of 
the procedures applicable to that right, are governed by the Idaho Appellate Rules. See Camp v. 
East Fork Ditch Co., Ltd., 137 Idaho 850, 860, 55 P.3d 304,314 (2002). That is because Idaho 
Code § 13-201 provides, "An appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court from a district court in 
any civil action by such parties from such orders and judgments, and within such times and in 
such manner as prescribed by Rule of the Supreme Court." 
As the Supreme Court also observed, "in enacting that statute, however, the legislature did 
not and could not divest itself of its constitutional power ... " related to the right to appeal. See 
Deeds v. Regence Blueshield of Idaho, 143 Idaho 210, 214-216, 141 P.3d 1079, 1083-1085 (2006) 
(emphasis added). Throughout the years, the Supreme Court has frequently recognized the 
legislature's authority to determine what may be appealed or under what circumstances. Oneida v. 
Oneida, 95 Idaho 105, 108,503 P.2d 305,308 (1972); Wilson v. DeBoard, 94 Idaho 562,563,494 
P.2d 566, 567 (1972); State ex rei. State Board of Medicine v. Smith, 80 Idaho 267, 269, 328 P.2d 
581,581-82 (1958), 80 Idaho at 328 P.2d at; Evans State Bank v. Skeen, 30 Idaho 703,704-05, 
167 P. 1165, 1165-66 (1917). 
Any attempted abrogation of the right to appeal6 must meet the constitutional 
requirements of due process and equal protection. Dowd, supra. The right to procedural due 
process guaranteed under both the Idaho and United States Constitutions requires that a person 
involved in the judicial process be given meaningful notice and a meaningful opportunity to be 
heard. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); 
Rudd v. Rudd, 105 Idaho 112, 115, 666 P.2d 639, 642 (1983) (citing Mays v. District Court, 34 
Idaho 200, 200 P. 115 (1921». While conceding this principle applies, the Bank contends the 
meaningful opportunity to be heard is met at the Sheriff's sale. This Court disagrees. 
By granting discretion to the courts, the legislature's solution meets due process 
requirements. The legislature correctly recognized occasions where compelling a cash deposit or 
6 The Court notes that this particular statutory appeal right is limited to civil litigation. Another statute addresses the 
right to appeal criminal convictions. I.e. § 19-2801. 
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supersedeas bond to prevent execution on certain property may be inequitable. However, the 
Idaho Appellate Rules do not contain such discretion making any hearing a waste of time.? 
Allowing a judgment creditor in the same action to end an appeal of that very judgment 
using this method violates due process because there is no meaningful opportunity to be heard. 
While the judgment debtor can have a hearing, such hearing is meaningless because the court has 
no discretion to grant any relief -- even though such discretion was clearly provided for by the 
legislature. Thus, the Court finds that allowing the Bank to execute on the Van Engelens' appeal 
rights in this case and thereby deny them their right to appeal violates due process. 8 
The Court agrees with the Tenth Circuit's clear uneasiness with this method of end 
running an appeal. The Tenth Circuit expressed real concerns over this practice in a case where a 
judgment creditor executed upon a final judgment in the same case that produced the judgment 
upon which it executed thus precluding any review of the merits. RMA Ventures California v. 
Sun America Life Ins. Co., 576 F.3d 1070, 1072-75 (loth Cir. 2009). On appeal, the only issue 
before the Tenth Circuit was whether the original judgment debtor had standing to continue to 
prosecute its appeal; the Tenth Circuit properly ruled it did not have standing. 
Although expressing its reservations, the Tenth Circuit refused to address the real issue 
head on because, according to the Tenth Circuit, the debtor "failed to preserve the issue for 
appeal" by not appealing the federal court's denial of its motion to stay execution on its appeal 
rights. Of course, this presupposes that the debtor, RMA, could have preserved it. However, it is 
7 To the extent that the Van Engelens direct the Court's attention to LR.C.P. 62(a) and LAR. 13(b)(8), such reliance 
is misplaced. LR.C.P. 62(a) does not apply to stays upon appeal, LR.C.P. 62(d) applies to stays upon appeal. 
Likewise, LAR. 13(b)(8) only applies to stays of injunctions or mandatory orders. LAR. 13(b)(l5) applies to staying 
execution or enforcement of monetary judgments. 
8 While the Bank discusses Utah cases, the Court notes that Utah does not have a statutory or constitutional right to 
appeal like Idaho's statute. Furthermore, a careful reading of those cases indicates that these were not choses in action 
in the same case. See Applied Medical Techs., Inc. v. Eames, 44 P.3d 699, 701 (Utah 2002)(allowing a judgment 
creditor to execute upon a final judgment in one case to purchase a chose in action in a separate and distinct case). 
Likewise, Utah also decided that it was bad public policy to allow a law firm to purchase the appeal rights of its own 
malpractice case. Snow, Nuffer, Engstrom & Drake v. Tanasse, 980 P.2d 208 (Utah 1999). In addition several states 
have expressly prohibited the purchase of a pending cause of action at an execution sale. See CaI.Civ.Proc.Code § 
699.720(a)(3); Prodigy Ctrs.lAtlanta v. T-C Assocs., 501 S.E.2d 209, 211 n. 3 (Ga. 1998) ("Choses in action are not 
liable to be seized and sold under execution, unless made so specifically by statute."). Criswell v. Ginsberg & 
Foreman, 843 S.W.2d 304, 306 (Tex.Ct.App. 1992) (holding that judgment creditor was barred from executing on 
judgment debtors claims against judgment creditor even though Texas statute provided generally for execution against 
causes of action). 
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questionable because its appeal rights would have been purchased by the judgment creditor, 
SunAmerica. This fact highlights the problem with this entire procedure. In a strong concurring 
opinion, one Judge, Circuit Judge Lucero, summarized the Circuit Judges' concerns as follows: 
It is with considerable understatement that the majority acknowledges the "degree 
of discomfort" presented by this case. While I am constrained to agree that we 
must dismiss, I am troubled by the manner in which SunAmerica has extinguished 
RMA's right to a merits appeal. 
This case presents a classic chicken-and-egg dilemma: By executing on a 
subsidiary judgment, SunAmerica has extinguished RMA's right to appeal the very 
merits determination that served as the predicate for the subsidiary judgment in the 
first place. If we were to reach the merits and reverse the district court's decision, 
however, there is little doubt that RMA would be entitled to relief from the 
subsidiary attorneys' fee judgment. .... RMA will not have the opportunity to 
pursue its merits appeal and thus no opportunity to file a 60(b)(5) motion. 
As a matter of public policy, I doubt the wisdom of a rule that readily 
places the right to appeal on an auction block. More troublesome still is a rule 
permitting a defendant to purchase its opponent's appellate rights, thereby 
extinguishing a plaintiff's claim. "[A defendant] obviously has no intention to 
litigate a claim against itself." Snow, Nuffer, Engstrom & Drake v. Tanasse, 980 
P.2d 208, 211 (Utah 1999). Today's decision thus incentivizes Utah defendants to 
attempt an end run around merits determinations by purchasing a plaintiff's right to 
appeal. This incentive is at its zenith when it is most offensive-in those cases in 
which a defendant believes it would likely lose the merits appeal. 
As the Utah Supreme Court has noted, the actual value of a claim 
purchased by an opponent at auction will never be fairly determined. Id. at 211-12. 
SunAmerica, of course, hoped to purchase RMA's claim at the lowest possible 
cost. Being the highest and only bidder, SunAmerica paid $10,000 to extinguish a 
claim against itself that RMA valued at over $950,000. (Perhaps not 
coincidentally, the defendant in Tanasse also paid $10,000 to purchase the claim 
against itself. Id. at 209). Because of our dismissal, we will not know whether 
SunAmerica paid fair value. 
Despite these problems, it appears that Utah law generally authorizes 
judgment creditors to purchase a chose in action through execution on another 
judgment. See Applied Med. Techs. v. Eames, 44 P.3d 699,701-02 (Utah 2002); 
Tanasse, 980 P.2d at 211. In the absence of a special relationship between the 
plaintiff and defendant, e.g., attorney/client, a chose in action is an alienable form 
of property under Utah law. Tanasse, 980 P.2d at 211. But in the typical 
situation-to the extent any such transaction may be termed "typical"-a judgment 
creditor executes upon a final judgment in one case to purchase a chose in action in 
a separate and distinct case. By contrast, SunAmerica purchased the right to appeal 
in the same case that produced the judgment upon which it executed. Thus this 
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appeal's circularity: We cannot reach the merits of this appeal if we grant the 
motion to dismiss, but we cannot know whether the motion to dismiss is well-
taken unless we reach the merits. 
Id. at 1076-77. 
The Court agrees with the Tenth Circuit's observations. It does present a "classic chicken-
and-egg dilemma." If the Court permits the Bank to execute on the Van Engelens' appeal rights in 
this instance, the Bank will have extinguished the Van Engelens' right to appeal the very merits 
determination that served as the predicate for the judgment in the first place. It would thus deprive 
the Van Engelens of their statutory right to appeal without due process of law. They will be 
unable to pursue the merits of their appeal. 
Therefore, the Court stays execution of the Van Engelens' appeal rights finding there is 
good cause to enter such stay. However, the Court will not stay any execution against any other 
property owned by the Van Engelens absent their compliance with LA.R. 13(b)(l5). This 
preserves the purpose for requiring a supersedeas bond or cash deposit - to ensure that property is 
available to satisfy a judgment if the appeal is not successful - while protecting the right to 
appeal. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this 13th day of September 2011. 
Che~y~ -
District Judge 
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WAIVE REQUIREMENT OF 
SUPERSEDEAS BOND AND 
STAY EXECUTION AND/OR 
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Chad E. Bernards, being first duly sworn, upon oath deposes and says: 
1. That, your affiant is one of the attorneys of record for the Plaintiff, Washington 
Federal, and makes this affidavit upon his personal knowledge. 
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
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2. That, this affidavit is made in support of Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendants' Motion 
to Waive Requirement of Supersedeas Bond and Stay Execution and/or Enforcement of the 
Judgment. 
3. That, attached hereto as Exhibit 1 is a true and correct copy of the June 10,2010, 
District Court's Order granting Motion to Stay Execution ast to Plaintiffs Rights in This Action 
Against Defendants, together with the Minute Entry. 
4. That, attached hereto as Exhibit 2 is a true and correct copy of the September 22, 2010 
Order Granting Application to Vacate Stay. 
5. That, attached hereto as Exhibit 3 is a true and correct copy of the January 31, 2011 
Order Denying Application for Stay. 
6. That, attached hereto as Exhibit 4 is a true and correct copy of the Certificate of Sale 
on Personal Property Sold Under Second Writ of Execution. 
7. That, attached hereto as Exhibit 5 is a true and correct copy of the Sheriffs Return on 
Second Writ of Execution. 
8. That, attached hereto as Exhibit 6 is a true and correct copy of the March 8, 2011 
Order Granting Motion to Dismiss. 
9. That, attached hereto as Exhibit 7 is a true and correct copy of the April 15, 2011 
Remittitur. 
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DATED this 15th day of July, 2011. 
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PLA.INTIFF'S MOTION 
CONTESTING DEFENDANTS' 
cLAIM OF EXEMPTION 
COMES NOW, the Pl<Qutiff, WASHINGTON FEDERAL SAVINGS ("Washington 
F eder{l1"), by and through its counsel of record, and pursuant to I.e. § 11-203(b) states the following 
grounds upon which. it contests the cla:itti of exemption made by the Vart Ehgelen Defendants on 
JUne 21, 2011 i particularly~ the Suppleme:tltal Claim ofExernption made on that same date, as to the 
following property: 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION CONTESTING DEFENDANtS' CLAiM of EXEMPTION 
~PAGE 1 
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Causes of action, chooses [ sic) in action, defenses <mdi or affirmative defenses, rights 
to appeal, and all rights, title, ?nd interest held by them in the litigation of 
Washington Federal Savings, a United States corporation vs. H. Cra.ig Van Engelen 
and Kristen Van Engelen, Case No. cV OC 09-11209 in the District Court of the 
Fourth Judicial District of the Stat~ otIdaho; in and for the. County of Ada including 
any interest in the appeal of the foregoing litigation, specifically, any and all rights, 
title and interest held by the V an Eng~1en defendants in the matter known as 
Washington F edetal Savings, a United States corporatiofi vs, H. Craig Van Engelen 
and Kristen Van Engeleu, Idaho Supreme Court Docket No. 38484-2011. 
See, Supplemental Claim of Exemption a.t pg. 2. 
The grounds for this obj~ction are as follows: 
1. Idaho law recognizes the above-:described '<lawsuit," and the appeal 
rights arising out of that lawsuit, as valuable property ri~ts. 
2. In the absence of a statutory exemption, the Plaintiff is entitled to 
seizure and execute upon the above-described property in satisfaction 
of its judgment. 
3. There is no statutory exemption for the abovC-'described property, and consequently 
it is subject to sei7.me litlder the writ of execution. 
In compliance with Fourth District Local Rille 8.1, this Motion i,s· :fu..'iher: -supported by ·the ... 
accompanying brief. A separate notice of hearing; also accomp?flies this Motion. 
Respectfully submitted this z...f> day of June, 2011. 
c~ 
Attorney for the Pla1n1i:ff 
Washington Federal 
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:MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
CONTESTING DEFENDANTS; 
CLAIM OF EXEMPTION 
QUESTION PRESENTED 
The Van Engelen Defendants have ass~ed that an exemption exists prote~ from seizure 
under a writ of execution their continuing rights as d~fendants in this action, and also in their rights 
as appellants in the appeal that they have taken to the Idaho Supreme Court resulting from the 
judgment that was entered against them iIi. this action. Such an exemption, if recognized under Idaho 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF.'S MOTION CONTESTING 
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law, woilld prevent Washington Federal from seizing the Van Engelens' rights in those "things in 
a<;tion" pursuant to its writ of execution under the judgment, and then. after seizing those rights, 
dismissing the V an Engelens; appeal The nature of the Defendants' claimed exemption, for which 
Washington Federal contests, is stated by the Defendants as follows: 
Causes of action, chooses [ sic] in action, defenses and/or affirmative defenses, rights 
to appeal, and all rights, title, and interest held by them in the iitigation of 
Washington Federal Savings, a United States corporation vs. H. Craig Van Engelen 
and Kristeh Van Engelell, Case No. CV OC 09-17209 in the District Court of the 
Fourth Jwicial District of the State ofIdaho, iIi and for the County of Ada including 
any interest in the appeal of the foregoing litigation, specifically, any and all rights; 
title and interest held by the Van Engelen defendants in the matter known as 
Washington Federal Savings; a United States corporation vs. H. Craig Van Engelen 
and Kristen Van Engelen, Idaho Supreme Court Docket No. 38484.,.2011. 
See, Supplemental Claim of Exemption at pg. 2. 
As is further argued below, the burden is upon the Van Engelens to establish a statutory basis 
for their claimed exemption. The Van Engdens failed to state an:x: statutory basis for their claimed 
eXemptlOilfiled with this Court. Although the law in Idaho is notpactlcularly well-developed on this 
question, claims that are made ill lawsuits have been sUltutorily declared to be ''propertf' under 
Idaho law within the general category of "things in action." Consequently, in the abs~ce of an 
applicable statutory exemption, there is no reason why Washington Federal should be precluded 
frOin s~izing the Van EngeleIis' appellate rights under its writ of executioh, and then dismissing that 
appeal. 
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The detennination of whether property is exempt from execution presents a question oflaw 
for the court to detennine through application of the express terms of a statutory exemption. If the 
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statute is unambiguou.s~ then it must be applied as written, unless the result would be palpably 
absurd. Grease Spot, Inc. v Harnes, 148 Idaho 582, 584,226 P.3d 524, 526 (2010). If the statute 
is ambiguous, then the interpretation of the statute presents a question of law to be determined by 
application of the rules of statutory interpretation by the court Id A statute is not ambiguous 
merely because an astute mind can devise more ~ on~ interpretation of it. Canty v. Idaho State 
Tax Commission, 138 Idaho 178, 182, 59 P.3d 983,985 (2002). 
Ill. 
ARGUMENT 
The general rule1 as .statedin. I. C. §-11.~ 20.1,-1s .fuat.a1l. pmperty. thatis «!WtQJ'.mp:t~·1s.1jahlf"" 
to attachment in satisfaction of a writ of execution on a judgment: 
§ 11-201. PROPERTY LIABLE TO SEIZURE - .A!Lgoods. chattels, 
moneys and other property~.~oth.r:eal and nersona!, or any interest therein of the 
judgment debtot. not exempt bv law, and all property and rights of property, seized 
and held under attachment in the action, ate liable to execution. Shares and interest 
in any corporation or company, and debts and credits, and all other property both real 
and personal, or any interest in e;ither real or personal property, and all other property 
not capable of manual delivery, may be attached on execution in like manner as upon 
writs of attachment. Gold dust must be returned by the offiver as so much money 
collected, at its current vallie, without exposing the same to sale. Until a levy, 
property is not affected by the execution. 
(Emphasis a4ded). 
Idaho law recognizes that a "thing in action," or a "chose in action" constitutes a valuable 
property right. Except for certain provisions li1 Idaho's Unifotm Probate Code, I.e. §§ 15-5-431, 
15-4-201, and 15-3-1201, and the Idaho Insurance Code, I.C. § 41-12.33, Idaho law generally uses 
the phrase "thing in action," rather than 'fchose in action;" to describe these property rights. Black's 
Law Dictionary lists "thlng in action" as aJ.~ alternative to the use of the phrase, "chose in action. " 
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See, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, atpg. 275 (9thed.; 2009 - West). In.Karlev. Visser. 141 Idaho 804, 
807-08, 118 P.3d 136, 139-140 (2005) the Idaho Supreme Court recognized a "lawsuit" as being 
'Withiri the category of property constituting a "chose in action" or <'thing in actioll'~ for pT.lIJ?oses of 
the definition of a "general intangible" under the UnifoI1Il Commercial Code. 
The following Idaho statutory definitions set out the basis in Idaho law for recognizing the 
Vali Engelens' property interest in their lawsuit and appeal, for which they have claimed an 
exemption from the Bank's writ of execution (although they have cited no statutory basis for that 
claimed e-xemption): 
73414. STATUTORY TERMS DEFiNED-
(2) The following words have, in the compiled laws, the: signification 
attached to them in this section, unless otherwise apparent from the context: 
( c) "Personal property" indudes money, goods, chattels; things in a~on. 
evidences of debt and .. general intangibles as defined in the uniform 
commercial code.: secured transactions. 
(Emphasis added). 
28-9-102. Definitions and index of defmitions. - (a) In this chapter: 
(42) «General intangible}' means any personal property; including things in 
action, other than accounts, chattel pa.per, commercial tort claims, deposit accounts, 
documents; goods, instruments, investment property, letter of credit rights, letters of 
credit, money, and oil. gas) or other minerals befor~ extraction. The term includes 
payment intangibles and software. 
(Emphasis added). 
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Under Idaho law a "thing in action'; is transferrable property> as declared in I.e. § 55A02, 
the text ofwmch is set out immediately below: 
55-402. TRANSFER AND DEVOLUTION OF TmNGS tN ACTION 
- A thing in action arising out oime vioiation of a right of property, or out of an 
obligation, may be transferred by the owner. Upon. the death of the owner it passes 
to his personal representatives, except where, iIi the cases provided in the Code of 
Civil Procedure) it pass~s to his devisees at successor in office. 
Ofparticular relevance to this matter) a ''thing in action" is specifi~.ally declared to be subje.ct 
to a writ of execution tinder I.e. § 11-301, which declares as follows: 
11-301. EXECUTION OF WRIT - The sheriff must execute the writ 
against the property of th~ judgment debtor by levying on a sufficient amount of 
property if there be sufficient; collecting or selling the t4i:.r!~ in action, and selling 
the other property, and paying to the plain:tiff or his attorney so much of the proceeds 
as will satisfy the judgrilent Arty excess in the proceeds ov¢t the judgment and 
accruing costs must be retutned t6 the jUdgment debtor unless otherwise directed by 
the judgment or order of the court When th~re is more property of the judgment 
debtor than is sufficient to satisfy the judgment and accruing costs within the view 
of the sheriff, he JJi'llSt levy only on such part of the property as the judgment debtor 
may indicate, if the property indicated be amply sufficient to satisfy the judgment and 
costs. 
the provisions of sections 8-507 through 8-507D, Idaho Code, shall apply to 
a levy upon personal property. 
(Emphasis added). 
Under Idaho law the burden of proof, which is required to establish that any particular 
property"is exempt by law" from execution, is placed upon that person or party that is claiming that 
exemption, wmchin this case is the Van Enge1ens. 35 c.J.S. Exetn]?tions. § 199 Presumptions and 
Burden of Proof - Nature, Character, (l,nd Value of Property. Cited in support of this general rule 
is the Idaho Court of Appeals decision in Hooper v, State, 127 Idaho 945, 908 P.2d 1252 (Ct.App. 
1995) in which that Court held as follows: 
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It is well recognized that a debtor's right to exempt property from the claims 
of creditors is not a.c0I:11ill0n law right but is del)endent upon constitutional or 
statutory all!lwance. 31 AM.JUR.Zd, Exemptions, § 2 (1989). Thus, the general 
rule is that assets are not exempt from-thc--claims-of-ercditois-'I.Scless--speeiflcally 
exempted by statutG. Jd, Furthehnore. a- debtor _claiming_an exemption generaHy 
must prove that hiS claim comes within the e~~inptioJi provisions. Id., § 367. 
127 Idaho at 950,908 P.2d at 1257 (emphasis added), 
Most ofldaho's exemption statutes are found in ch?-pter 6, title 11 of the Idaho Code. No 
statute within that chapter provides any basis in support of an exemption that would apply to the Van 
Engelens' rights in the lawsuit, or its appeal. The Van Engelens have offered no citation to any 
statutory or conStitutional basis that would support theft claim of exemption, 
Nor does the Van Enge1ens' claimed exemption fall within the scope of the general purpose 
that is to be served by Idaho; s exemption statutes, which was set out iIi Lemp v_ Lemp, 32 Idaho 391 ~ 
184 P. 222 (1919) in reliance upon the following statement of the holding of the California Supreme 
Court in Holmes v. Marshall, 145 Cal. 777,79 P. 534 (1905): 
"In COIiStnring this statute, as in the construction of all statutes, it is the duty 
of tile court to arrive at the intent of the L~gislature, if it can be done, from the 
language used in the statute. Statutes exempting property from execution are enacted 
on the ground of public policy, for the benevolent purpose ofsaving debtors and their 
families from want by n~ason of Diislortune Or improvidence. The general rule now 
is to construe such statutes liberally, SO as to carry out the intention of the Legislature 
. .T.~is_f~_v:'~~_ ~~~eiy~~ _by_~F! ,F~0rn_?k~~!?X _~~rv~r:..f.or_r.no_r~ il!form.~~lol],-v~?it: ~t!p:"~,gfi.com, 
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McMillan v. Us. Fire Insurance Co., 48 Idaho 163, 168, 2S0 P. 220, 222 (1929) ("Conceding that 
exemption statutes are to be liberally construed (Coughanour v. Ho.f.fir.11l1 ~. Es{ate;· ;!-Idcllo ·290; 1-3 
P. 231; Elliot v. Hall, :3 Idaho 421; 35 Am.St 285,31 P, 796,18 L.RA. 586), it must likewise be 
borne in mind that exemptiohs are bilt creatures of statute, and that while the statutes will be liberally 
construed, such construction should be reasohable. (See 25 C. J., p. 11.)"). The Idaho Bankruptcy 
Court made the following observation in a 20 10 decision, In Re Grimmett, 2010 WL 1257363, at * 
3 (Bkrtcy.D.Ida.~ March 24; 2010) ("[W]hile Idaho's exemption statutes are liberally construed in 
Debtor's favor, the statutory language may 110t bE? "tortured'; in the guise of liberal co:i:lStruction. "). 
In the absence of any applicable exemption, the Van Eng;elens have no basis to sustain their 
objection to the seizure of their rights in the lawsuit and apPf?al as stated in their claim of exemption.. 
Even though the Van Engelens have not stated. any basis in support of their claimed 
exemption, Washington Federal anticipates that they will argue that, even though a "chose in action,)) 
or a "thing in action" can be seized in satisfaction of a writ of executio~ an appeal right is not fairly 
encompassed within that category of property rights. 
Although no Idaho appellate case appears to have addr~ssed this issue, several other 
jurisdictions have addressed this question and held in various different contexts that a chose or thing 
in action necessarily encompasses the right to appeal that is associated with the underlying cause of 
action or claim. See e.g., RMA Ventures California v. Sun America Life Ins. Co., 576 F.3d 1070, 
1072, 1075 (10th Cir. 2009) ("The property noticed for public sale, however, was Plaintiff's right 
to the chose in action (i. e, the legal. claims) against Defendants in the instant case, including 
Plaintiff's right to appeal the district court's grant of sumrri.aty judgment." ... "[W]e are unable to 
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ignore the fact that a public execution sale took plate in which Defendants purchased Plaintiff siegal 
right to continue this appeal for $10,000."); Department aftransportation v. Foster, 586 S.E.2d 64, 
65 (Ga.App.2003) ("The right to appeal the condemnor' S ~ate of just and adequate compensate 
is a chose in action."); and Ridgeway v. Jones) 84 So. 692, 693 (Miss.1920) (" [l]he assignee of any 
interest in a chose in action may begin, prosecute, and continue any suit at action thereon in the 
name of the assignor, in which right is necessarily embraced that of an appeal to this court."). 
I11 Smith v. Corlett and Rosera, (Ada County District Court Case No. CV OC 2008-09440; 
Supreme Court Docket No. 37060-2009), the Plaintiff. Smith, appealed an adverse judgment and 
award of attorneys fees awarded. When the Plaintiff failed. to post an app¢al bon~ the Defendant 
caused the Ada County Sheriff to execute upon the Plaintiff's appeal rights. Upon application by 
the Plaintiff, the trial court entered an Order staying the execution sale. The Defendant then 
appealed the trial court's stay order. Following briefing, in an unpublished Order, without 
discussion; the Supreme Court vacated the trial court's stay order. The Defendant purchased the 
:Plaintiff s appeal rights at the execution sale and thereafter dismisSed the appeal. Attached is a copy 
of the Supreme Court's Order vacating the trial court; s stay order. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
Pursuant to the reasons outlined above, Washington Federal respectfully requests that its 
Motion Contesting Defendants' Claim of Exemption with respect to Defendants' appeal rights 
be granted. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PLAIl"iTIFF'S MOTION CONTESTING 
DEFENDANTS' CLAIM OF EXEMPTION - 8 
3365956 Page 15/17 Date: 6128/201 :07 PM 
Respectfully submitted this 2& day of June, 2011. 
c~s~-
Attorney for the Plaintiff 
Washington Federal 
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Defendant- Third Party Plaintiff-
Respondent, 
) ORDER GRANTING APPLICATION 
) TO VACATE STAY 
) 
) Supreme Cotirt Docket No. 37060-2009 
) Ada County Docket No. 2008-9440 
CATHY ROSERA, ) 





ANTHONY C. D' ANGELO and JUDY 
D'ANGELO, husband and wife, and 







Third Party Defendants. ) 
1. An APPLICATION TO VACATE STAY IMPOSED BY THE DISTRICT COURT and 
a MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF APPLICATION TO VACATE STAY 
IMPOSED BY THE DISTRlcT COURT were filed by counsel for Respondents on June 
16,20l0. 
2. An APPLlCA TION OF JAMES SMITH FOR ORDER STAYING EXECUTION AS 
to PLAINTIFF'S RIGHTS IN II-lIS ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANTS and a 
MEMORANDUM RESPONDING TO APPLICATION TO VACATE STAY 
IMPOSED BY THE DISTRICT COURT AND SUPPORTING APPLICATION OF 
JAMES SMITH FOR ORDER STAYING EXECTUION AS TO PLAINTIFF'S 
RIGHTS IN THIS ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANTS were file t y counsel for 
Appellanl on June 30, 2010. En - on JSI 
By:~~ ___ _ 
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3. An OBJECTION TO THE APPLICATiON OF JAMES SMITH FOR ORDER 
STAYING EXECUTION AS TO PLAINTIFF'S RiGHTS IN THIS ACT10N 
AGAINST DEFENDANTS and a REPLY MEMOR..t\NDUM TN SUPPORT OF 
APPLICA nON TO v ACA TE STAY IMPOSED BY THE DISTRICT COURT were 
filed by counsel for Respondents on July 12,20 10. 
4. A REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' OBJECTION TO THE APPLICATION OF JAMES 
SMITH FOR ORDER STAYING EXECUTION AS TO PLAINTIFF'S RIGHTS IN 
THIS ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANTS was filed by counsel for Appellant on July 
28,2010, 
The Court is fully advised; therefore, good cause appealing, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Respondents; APPLICATION TO VACATE STAY 
IMPOSED BY THE DISTRICT COURT be, and hereby is, GRANTED. 
o 
~ 
DATED this ~_ day of $eptelnber 2010. 
cc: Counsel of Record 
'.:: ORDER GRANTING APpLICATION 10 VACATE STAY - Docket No. 37060-2009 
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DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
WASHINGTON FEDERAL SAVINGS. a 
United States Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
H. CRAIG V AN ENGELEN and KRISTEN 
VAN ENGELEN, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-OC 0917209 
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
CONTESTING CLAIM OF EXEMPTION 
Defendants H. Craig Van Engelen and Kristen Van Engelen ("the Van Engelens") submit 
this Opposition to the Motion of Plaintiff Washington Federal Savings ("Washington Federal" or 
"the Bank") contesting their claim of exemption. 
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BACKGROUND 
In the underlying action, the paliies are in a dispute about the effect of a continuing 
personal guaral1tee. This Court previously entered summ~ry judgment in favor of the Bank, 
which decision the Van Engelens appealed on January 25,2011. That appeal is ongoing; the 
Van Engelens recently submitted their Appellant's Brief to the Idaho Supreme Court and are 
awaiting the filing of the Bank's Respondent's Brief. As the Van Engelens were unable to post a 
supersedeas bond l on the judgment, which exceeded $5 million, on May 12,2011, the Court 
issued a Writ of Execution. Of course, if the Van Engelens' appeal is successful, the Judgment 
and Washington Federal's right to collect thereon will be vacated. 
However, on June 16,2011, DefendantsH. Craig Van Engelen and Kristen Van Engelen 
were served with a Notice and Notice of Levy that, pursuant to the Writ of Execution issued on 
May 12,2011, Washington Federal was levying and attaching the Van Engelen's right to appeal 
this case -- the very case in which the Writ of Execution was issued. (Affidavit of Counsel in 
Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion Contesting Claim of Exemption ("Aff. of Counsel"), ~ 3, Ex. 
A.) A sheriffs sale of their right to appeal was scheduled. (!d. at ~ 4, Ex. B.) The Van Engelens 
therefore filed a claim of exemption contesting Washington Federal's right to foreclose on its 
right to appeal the case which provides the basis for the Judgment and Writ of Execution. (Id. at 
~ 5, Ex. C.) See Idaho Code §§ 8-507A and 11-203. As Washington Federal admits in its 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff Motion Contesting Defendants Claim of Exemption, it is 
Washington Federal's intention to execute on the Van Engelens right to appeal and thereafter 
dismiss the appeal. (Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion Contesting Defendants' 
Under Idaho Appellate Rule 13(b)(15), execution upon a judgment may be stayed during 
the pendency of an appeal upon the posting of a supersedeas bond in the amount of the judgment 
plus 36% of such amount. 
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Claim of Exemption, p. 2.) That is, Washington Federal intends to purchase"its opponents' right 
to appeal in the very case that produced the judgment upon whlch it is executing. 
If such a procedure is allowed, this will create a procedure in Idaho whereby the only 
party who has a dght to appeal a potentially erroneous decision is a party who has enough money 
to post a supersedeas bond or other acceptable security. LA.R. 13(b)(14) and (15). In all other 
circumstances, the right to appeal will be effectively foreclosed. The palty holding the judgment 
, . 
in the case could always execute on its opponent's right to appeal, purchase that right for some 
sum,2 and then, rather than addressing the merits of the appeal which seeks to undo the very 
judgment upon which it has executed, simply dismiss its opponent's appeal. This is a highly 
convenient solution for the Respondent to a civil appeal, but not one which can be permitted 
under Idaho law. 
ARGUMENT 
The Van Engelens do not contest that the right to appeal may be a valuable "thing in 
action" which under ordinal}' circumstances may be executed upon by a judgment creditor in 
satisfaction of another judgment. See Idaho Code § 11~301. However, to permit the right to 
appeal to be executed upon in the very action where the validity of the judgment is at issue on 
. appeal is against public policy, would create an absurdity, and render other Idaho statutes a 
nUllity. As such, this Court should hold that the right to appeal the judgment upon which a writ 
of execution is based is exempt from execution. 
There is little case law discussing an attempt by a judgment creditor to execute upon the 
judgment debtor's right to appeal that very judgment. It appears that the only case on poine is 
2 Possibly even a de minimus sum. 
3 In its brief, Washington Federal cites a number of cases for the unremal'kable position 
that the right appeal is a chose in action. These cases have little value in the issue of this cases, 
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the Tenth Circuit case RMA Ventures California v. SunAmerica Life Ins. Co., 576 F.3d 1070 
(10t11 Cir. 2009). A concuning opinion in that case aptly explains the conundlum before the 
Court: 
This case presents a classic chicken-and-egg dilemma: By executing on a 
subsidiary judgment, SunAmel"ica has extinguished RMA' s right to appeal the 
very merits determination that served as the predicate for the subsidiary judgment 
in the first place. -
As a matter of public policy, I doubt the wisdom of a mle that readily 
places the right to appeal on an auction block. More troublesome still is a rule 
permitting a defendant to purchase its opponent's appellate rights, thereby 
extinguishing a plaintiff's claim. "[A defendant] obviously has no intention to 
litigate a claim against itself." Snow, Nuffer, Engstrom & Drake v. Tanasse, 980 
P.2d 208, 211 (Utah 1999). Today's decision thus incentivizes Utah defendants to 
attempt an end run around merits detenninations by purchasing a plaintiffs right 
to appeal. This incentive is at its zenith when it is most offensive-in those cases in 
which a defendant believes it would likely lose the merits appea1. ... 
. . . it appears that Utah law generally authorizes judgment creditors to 
purchase a chose in action through execution on another judgment. .. But in the 
typical situation-to the extent any such transaction may be termed "typlcal"-a 
judgment creditor executes upon a final judgment in one case to purchase a chose 
in action in a separate and distinct case. By contrast, SunAmerica purchased the 
right to appeal in the same case that produced the judgment upon which it 
executed. Thus this appeal's circularity: We cannot reach the merits of this appeal 
if we grant the motion to dismiss, but we cannot know whether the motion to 
dismiss is well-taken unless we reach the merits. 
fd at 1076 (Lucro, Circuit Judge, concurring). Despite their misgivings, that concurring judge 
and the Tenth Circuit neveliheless approved the purchase of the appeal rights in that case 
because RMA had waived its arguments by failing to appeal the district court's denial oftlle 
however, as none of them address whether a party may obtain his opponents right to appeal. For 
example, the question in Department ofTransp. v. Foster, 262 Ga.App. 524, 586 S.E.2d 64 
(Ga.App. 2003) was simply whether the administratix of an estate has starting to appeal after the 
death of a property owner. Ridgeway v. Jones, 122 Miss. 624,84 So. 692 (Miss. 1920) merely 
noted that an assignee of an interest may prosecute an appeal in the name of the assignor. 
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motion to stay or quash execution. No such circumstance exists here, where the Van Engelens 
are actively seeking to protect their right td appeal. 
A. Public Policy Prevents a Party fl'om Purchasing its Opponent's Rights 
A number of courts have held that public policy prevents a pmty from purchasing its 
opponent's rights with respect to other lawsuits between the palties. While these cases are not 
directly on point - for the present case is concemed with the more troubling situation involving 
the purchase of the right to appeal the very judgment being enforced - they nevertheless 
articulate policy concems that are also implicated here. For example, in the case Snow, Nuffer, 
Engstrom & Drake v. Tanasse, 980 P.2d 208, 211 (Utah 1999), a former client sued his attorney 
for malpractice, and the attorney sued in a different case for his fees. The attorney received a 
default judgment for his fees. After obtaining the judgment, the attorney sought to satisfy that 
judgment by executing against the fmmer client's interest in the legal malpractice action. The 
attorney purchased the malpractice action at a sheriff's sale for $10,000. On appeal, the Utah 
Supreme COUlt reversed this. It held that although the malpractice cause of action was 
something that could generally be purchased by a judgment creditor, for reasons of public policy 
the very law firm again which the malpractice claim had been brought could not purchase the 
cause of action. Id, 980 at 211. The Supreme COUlt said: 
The acquisition oftrus legal malpractice claim by [attomey] creates two problems. 
First it has the effect of denying [former client] the right to a trial on his 
claims. See Utah Const. ali. I, § 11. [Attorney] obviously has no intention to 
litigate a claim against itself: 
When a judgment debtor's cause of action against his judgment 
creditor is turned over to the judgment creditor, the judgment 
creditor becomes the holder of a cause of action against himself. 
The judgment creditor becomes both plaintiff and defendant. 
Under such circumstances, any justifiable controversy is 
extinguished. Thus, the judgment debtor is forever deprived of his 
day in court on that cause of action. 
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CriSVo'ell v. Ginsberg & Foreman, 843 S.W.2d 304, 306 (Tex.Ct.App.l992) .. ,. 
Second, the appropriate value of the legal malpractice claim will never be fairly 
determined .. " [Attorney], whose incentives are in favor of under-valuation, 
purchased the claim and assigned it the value of$10,000 .... [Attorney's] 
assigned value of$10,000 was completely arbitrary. 
Snow, NUjJel~ Engstrom & Drake, 980 P.2d at 211. But see Applied Medical Technologies, Inc. 
v. Eames, 44 P.3d 699, 701 (2002) (declining to extend Snow Nuffer to preclude non-attorney 
civil defendants £i'om purchasing causes of action against themselvest. 
The same situation exists here. First, it has the effect of denying the Van Engelens of 
their statutOlY right to appeal. Idaho Code § 13-201 provides that "[a]n appeal may be taken to 
the Supreme Court from a district court in any civil action by such palties from such orders and 
judgments, and \vithin such times and in such manner as prescribed by Rule ofthe Supreme 
COUlt." Idaho Appellate Rule 4 expands on this, stating that "[a]ny party aggrieved by an 
appealable judgment, ol~der or decree, as defined in these rules, of a district cOUli ... may appeal 
such decision to the Supreme Comt as provided in these rules." If Washington Federal is 
permitted to execute upon the Van Engelens' right to appeal, it will have the effect of denying 
the Van Engelen their statutory right to appeaL 
Second, such a procedure undelmines the very purpose of the execution statutes because 
it creates a perverse incentive for Washington Federal to undervalue the right to appeal. 
Washington Federal is obviously not going to pursue an action against itself, but has admitted 
4 Applied Medical Technologies, and indeed, any case in which an opposing party is 
penmtted to pmchase its opponent's separate cause of action against itself, is readily 
distinguishable £i'om the present case. While the cases conceming the purchase of other causes. 
of action are instructive because they implicate some of the same policy concems, the 
circumstance in the present case goes far beyond this question. In the present case, the question 
is whether a party can execute upon a judgment in order to purchase the right to appeal that very 
judgment. As explained in more detail in the section below, the policy against allowing such a 
circular procedure is even stronger than in cases concerned merely with the purchase of other 
unrelated causes of action between the pmties. 
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that it intends to obtain the Van Engelen's right to appeal so that it can dismiss that appeal.s 
Moreover, the appropriate value of this right to appeal cannot be fairly determined. It would be 
the Van Engelens contention that the value of their right to appeal the judgment is the amount of 
the judgment itself, but presumably Washington Federal does not intend to bid that amount. 
Indeed, as the amount of the sale will be offset against the judgment, Washington Federal has 
incentives in favor of under-valuation. This is utterly counter to the purpose of the Idaho 
execution statutes, which are designed to allow a judgment creditor to seize property so that its 
judgment can be satisfied. TVilliams v. Paxton, 98 Idaho 155, 157,559 P.2d 1123, 1125 (1976) 
(party was entitled to a writ of execution to satisfY his judgment). As such, as in Snow Nuffer, 
this Comt should hold that execution upon the Van Engelen's right to appeal violates public 
policy. 
Similarly, in the case Criswell v. Ginsberg & Foreman, 843 S.W.2d 304, 306 
(Tex.Ct.App.1992), a Court held that a party could not acquire a cause of action against itself to 
satisfy a judgment. In that case, Criswell sued Ginsberg. That cause of action was pending with 
no final judgment entered. Previously, Ginsberg had received ajudgment against Criswell in 
another case. Ginsberg therefore requested an order from the comt that Criswell "turn over" its 
cause of action against Ginsberg to satisfy that earlier judgment. This was based on a Texas 
statute that allows a judgment creditor to bring a motion for court assistance in reaching property 
of the judgment debtor that cannot readily be attached or levied. Texas Code § 31.002. The 
Texas court held it was umeasonable to use this tumover statute for Ginsberg to extinguish a 
cause of action against himself. Id, 843 S.W.3d at 306-307. See, also, Charles v. Tamez, 878 
5 No other pmty has an interest in purchasing this right to appeal, as the only value of the 
appeal is the possibility for the Van Engelens to be given a chance to continue to defend a 
lawsuit against them. 
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S.W.2d 201,206 (Tex.App. 1994) ("allowing creditors to use the turnover statute to purchase 
potential causes of action against them in order to extinguish those claims would be 
unreasonable");Associated Ready A1ix, Inc. v. Douglas, 843 S.W.2d 758, 762 (Tex.Ct.App.1992) 
(a tunl0ver action in which an opponent's causes of action against Party are assigned to Party, 
thus resulting in extinguishing the cause of action, does not accomplish the purpose ofthe 
turnover statute). 6 The same situation exists here. As noted above, the Idaho execution statutes 
are designed to allow a judgment creditor to seize property so that its judgment can be satisfied. 
Williams, 98 Idaho at 157,559 P.2d at 1125. As with the Texas turnover statute in Criswell, it is 
an unreasonable abuse of the purpose of those statutes to employ them to extinguish a cause of 
action against the judgment creditor. As such, the Court should hold that the Van Engelens right 
to appeal from the very judgment that Washington Federal is trying to enforce is exempt from 
execution. 
B. Permitting Washington Federal to Purchase the Cause of Action Against Itself Will 
Create an Absurdity and Render Other Statutes a Nullity 
Washington Federal contends that it is entitled to execute upon the Van Engelens right to 
appeal the very judgment upon which it is attempting to execute under Idaho Code § 11-201, 
which provides that "[a]ll goods, chattels, moneys and other property, both real and personal, or 
any interest therein of the judgment debtor, not exempt by law, and all property and rights of 
property, seized and held under attachment in the action, are liable to execution;" and under I.C. 
§ 11-301, which provides that "[t]he sheriff must execute the writ against the property of the 
judgment debtor by levying on a sufficient amount of propelty if there be sufficient; collecting or 
6 These Texas authorities ru:e pruiiculru'ly persuasive because under I.e. § 11-602, 
"Nonresidents are entitled to the exemptions provided by the law of the jurisdiction of their 
residence." The Van Engelens are no longer residents of Idaho, but of Texas. 
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTlFF'S MOTION CONTESTING CLAM OF EXEMPTION - 8 
selling the things in action, and selling the other property, and paying to the plaintiff or his 
attorney so much of the proceeds as will satisfy the judgment." It contends that as a "thing in 
action," the right to appeal is therefore subject to execution under the plain language of the 
statute. It asserts that because the right to appeal the judgment being executed upon is not 
expressly outlined in Idaho's exemption statutes, no exemption can be claimed. See Hooper v. 
State, 127 Idaho 945, 950, 908 P.2d 1252, 1257 (Ct. App. 1995) ("the general rule is that assets 
are not exempt from the claims of creditors unless specifically exempted by statute") (emphasis 
added). 
However, while a Court must ordinarily give effect to the plain, unambiguous language 
of a statute, if the result is palpably absurd, the Court must engage in statutory construction. 
Wheeler v. Idaho Dept. o/Health and Welfare,147 Idaho 257, 263, 207 PJd 988, 994 (2009). 
Constructions of a statute that would lead to absurd or unreasonably harsh results are disfavored 
Payette River Property Owners Ass'n v. Board o/Com'rs o/Valley County, 132 Idaho 551, 557, 
976 P.2d 477, 483 (1999). This Court has a "duty to ascertain the legislative intent, and give 
effect to that intent." Wheeier,147 Idaho at 263,207 P.3d at 994. The Court must construe a 
statute as a whole, and consider all sections of applicable statutes together to determine the intent 
of the legislature. Id. It is incumbent upon a court to give a statute an interpretation that will not 
render it a nullity. Hecla Min. Co. v. Idaho State Tax Com 'n, 108 Idaho 147, 151,697 P.2d 
1161,1165 (1985). "[The Court] also must take account of all other matters such as the 
reasonableness of the proposed interpretations and the policy behind the statute." Wheeler,147 
Idaho at 263, 207 P.3d at 994. 
If the Court permits the interpretation suggested by Washington Federal, such 
interpretation will lead to absurd and harsh results, be counter to the purpose of the execution 
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statutes, and render other applicable statutes a nullity. In a circular fashion, Washington Federal 
is attempting to execute upon the right to appeal the very judgment upon which Washington 
Federal predicates its right to execute. lfthe court approves of such a procedure, it will have 
accepted of a perverse new way for wealthy respondents to evade appellate review simply 
because poorer appellants are unable to post security 01' purchase their own right to appeal at a 
sheriff s sale. This is palpably absurd and deeply unjust. 
Furthelmore, this interpretation of the execution statues does not advance the policy 
behind those statutes. The purpose of the execution statutes is to enable a judgment creditor to 
satisfy his judgment. Williams, 98 Idaho at 157,559 P.2d at 1125. The purpose of the procedure 
proposed by Washington Federal is not to satisfy the judgment, but rather to forever insulate that 
potentially erroneous judgment from appellate review. This is not a valid purpose, much less a 
purpose in keeping with the policy of the execution statutes. 
This interpretation would also render other applicable statutes a nullity. First, under this 
interpretation, unless an appellant can obtain a stay of the writ of execution, he will have no 
functional ability to appeal. This would undelmine a number of statutes and rules which govern 
appeals. Idaho Code § 13-201 arid Idaho Appellate Rule 4 give any pruty aggrieved by an 
appellate judgment the right to appeal. Notably, these rules do not provide that the right to 
appeal exists only if the pruiy can afford a supersedeas bond or other security. In addition, it 
would undermine I.A.R. 16(b), which provides a procedure whereby the party in whose favor an 
execution may issue may agree in writing that the party will not execute pending the appeal, in 
which case no supersedeas bond"is necessary. If Washington Federal's interpretation ofthe 
execution statutes were allowed, no pruty would ever agree to such a waiver. If the other patty 
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could not afford a supersedeas bond, then the judgment creditor could refuse to waive the bond 
and simply foreclose upon the right tol appeal. 
Given all of this, it cannot be concluded that the Legislature intended to permit a 
judgment creditor to use his judgment as a means to strip the judgment debtor of the right to 
appeal the judgment. The COUlt should not interpret the execution statute to pennit this unjust 
result. 
C. The Unpublished Order in Smith v. Corlett Provides no Guidance 
Washington Federal cites to the case Smith v. Corlett and Rosera, (Ada County District 
Court Case No. CV OC 2008-09440) and an unpublished Supreme Court order (Supreme COUlt 
Docket No. 37060-2009) in SUppOlt of its attempt to execute on the Van Engelens right to appeal. 
In that case, a plaintiff sued the defendant on various causes of action. On smnmary judgment, 
the district dismissed all claims filed by the plaintiff. (Aff. of Counsel, ~ 6, Ex. D.) The Court 
awarded attorney fees and costs to the defendants in an amount exceeding $35,000 and entered a 
judgment for the same. (Id.) The plaintiff appealed the smnmary judgment entered in favor of 
the defendant. (Jd. at ~ 7, Ex. E.) Thereafter, the defendant levied against "the causes of action 
and choses in action held by Plaintiff," which included the plaintiffs right to appeal the 
judgment being executed upon. (Jd. at ~ 6, Ex. D). A sheriff sale was scheduled. (Id. at, 8, Ex. 
F.) Plaintiff thereafter filed for and received a stay of this sale, contending that such a levy was 
illegal. (Jd at~ 9, Ex. G.) Without comment or analysis, in an unpublished Order signed by the 
Clerk of the Supreme Court, the stay imposed by the District Court was vacated. (Memorandum 
in Support of Plaintiff's Motion Contesting Defendants' Claim of Exemption, at the Exhibit 
Thereto.) The Clerk of the Supreme COUlt may have vacated the stay for any number of reasons, 
including improper procedure or waiver of the argwn~nt. Simply put, we cannot know why this 
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occurred, much less infer from this Order that the Supreme Court has or would approve of the 
procedure of foreclosing on the right to appeal in order to satisfy the judgment that is the very 
issue of the appeal. The Court should therefore disregard Washington Federal's citation to this 
unpublished order. 
CONCLUSION 
The Coillt should hold that, because of the absurd and unjust results which would occur if 
a party is able to execute upon a judgment by foreclosing its opponents right to appeal that very 
judgment, the Court should sustain the Van Engelens' claim of exemption. 
DATED this 1 st day of July, 2011. 
OODARD SCHWARTZMAN 
Attorneys for Deftndants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 1st day of July, 2011, a Due and COLTect copy of the 
within and foregoing instrument was served upon: 
David E. Wislmey 
Attol11ey and Counselor at Law 
988 S. Longmont, Ste. 100 
P.O. Box 837 
Boise, ID 83701 
o U.S. Mail 
~ Facsimile (208) 336-5956 o Hand Delivery 
o Overnight Delivery 
Dara 1. Parkel) 
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Thomas A. Banducci (ISB No. 2453) 
tbanducci@bwslawgroup.com 
Wade L. Woodard (ISB No. 6312) 
wwooddrd@bwslawgroup. com 
Dara Parker (ISB No. 7177) 
dparker@bwsiawgroup.com 
Banducci Woodard Schwartzman PLLC 
802 W. Bannock St., Suite 500 
Boise, ID 83702 
Telephone: (208) 342-4411 
Facsimile: (208) 342-4455 
Attorneys for Defendants 
(;t-th ..... 
IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN Al,,1J) FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
WASHINGTON FEDERAL SAVINGS, a 
United States Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
. H. CRAIG VAN ENGELEN and KRISTEN 
VAN ENGELEN, 
Defendants. 
County of Ada ) 
): ss 
State of Idaho ) 
Case No. CV -OC 0917209 
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN 
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFPS MOTION 
CONTESTING CLAIM OF EXEMPTION 
Dara L. Parker, fIrst being duly sworn, subscribes and states· as follows: 
1. I am an attorney for Defendants in the above captioned case. 
I 
2. I make this affidavit upon my personal mowledge. 
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION CONTESTING CLAIM OF 
EXEMl'TION - 1 
3. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the Notice of Levy. 
4. Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a tme and correct copy of the Notice of Sheriffs 
Sale. 
5. Attached hereto as Exhibit C is a tme and correct copy of the Van Engelens' 
Supplemental Claim of Exemption. 
6. Attached hereto as Exhibit D is a true arid correct copy ofthe Notice of Levy filed 
in the case Smith v. Corlett and Rosera, (Ada County District Court Case No. CV OC 2008-
09440). 
7. Attached'hereto as Exhibit E is a true and correct copy of the Notice of Appeal in 
the case Smith v, Corlett and Rosera, (Ada County District Court Case No. CV OC 2008-09440). 
8. Attached hereto as Exhibit F is a true and correct copy of the Notice of Sheriff s 
Sale in the case Smith v. Corlett and Rosera, (Ada County District Comi Case No. CV OC 2008-
09440). ' 
9. Attached hereto as Exhibit G is a true and correct copy of the Order Quashing 
Sheriffs Sale in the case Smith v. Corlett and Rosera, (Ada County District Court Case No. CV 
OC 2008-09440). 
DATED this 151 day of July, 2011. 
SUBSGR1~~!lW~jN before me this 151 day of July, 2011 
..:-,~"", lIP. ~ ._ \ 
~ (' NO~ ~. ~){~~~~~~_~~~~.~_I~'~I·~'C~~~~~~ ________________ _ 
: tt> flO. '. 'ta 6 E NofuIY Public for Idaho . 
... .-4 GIl" - R 'd' t ,c\\( . ~..hl cd, ~ -:~. lil./o ~ eSl mg a: ""UJb \ 
~~~ ~ My commission expires: l6(,?(Qc:J.\ 
~~ Of:' ...... ···0 ,;$' 
""1 IDAt\ \\\" 
"lluB\\\ 
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EXEMPTION c 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 1st day of July, 2011, a true and correct copy of the 
within an4 foregoing instrument was served upon: 
David E. Wislmey 
Attorney and Counselor at Law 
988 S. Longmont, Ste. 100 
P.O~ Box 837 
Boise, ID 83701 
o U.S. Mail 
~ Facsimile (208) 336-5956 o Hand Delivery o Overnight Delivery 
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION CONTESTING CLAIM OF 
EXEMPTION - 3 
EXHIBIT A 
David E. WishneYt I.S.B. # 1993 
Chad E. Bernards, LS.B. #7441 
Attorney and Counselor at Law 
988 S. Longmont, Ste. 100 
P.O. Box 837 
Boise, ID 83701 
Telephone: (208) 336-5955 
Facsimile: (208) 336-5956 
Attorneys for 'VYashington Federal Savings 
) 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
WASHINGTON FEDERAL SA VINGS, ) 
a United States corporation, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs, ) CASE NO. CV OC 09-17209 
) 
vs. ) 
) NOTICE OF LEVY 
H. CRAIG VAN ENGELEN and KRISTEN ) 
VAN ENGELEN, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
TO: H. CRAIG VAN ENGELEN and KRISTEN VAN ENGELEN: 
YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that by.virtue of an Amended Judgment 
entered on December 14, 2010, District Court of the Fourth Judicial District for the County 
of Ada, State of Idaho, in the above-captioned action, Defendants H. Craig Van Engelen and 
Kristen Van Engelen, a married couple, oWe,jointly and severally, the sum of$5,036,998. 86, 
plus interest accruing thereon at the statutory rate, to Plaintiff Washington Federal Savings. 
NOTICE OF LEVY - Page 1 
By virtue of a Writ of Execution issued in this action on Hay 12 _, 2011, I have this day 
{ 
levied upon all claims, causes of action, choses in action, defenses andlor affirmative 
defenses and rights to appeal, and all rights, title, and interest held by the Defendants H. 
Craig Van Engelen and Kristen Van EngeIen in the litigation of Washington Federal Savings, 
a United States corporation vs. H. Craig Van Engelen and Kristen Van Engelen, Case No. 
CV 09-11209 in the District Court ofthe Foutth Judicial District of the State ofIdaho, in and 
for the County of Ada, including any interest in the appeal of the foregoing litigation, 
specifically, any and aU rights, title, and interest held 'by H. Craig Van Engelen and Kristen 
Van Engelen in the matter known as Washington Federal Sayings, a United States 
corporation VS. H. Craig Van En gel en and Kristen Van Engelen, Idaho Supreme COUlt 
Docket No. 38484-2011, to satisfy the amount of $5,148,304.26 due and owing under the 
foregoing judgment. 
I ( II June DATED THfS _(_ day ofMey, 2011. 
NOTICE OF LEVY w Page 2 
fkMu.llflllA!J" SHERIFF 
clVitseOTiON . 
7200 BARRleITf!R ~A 
BOrSE; IDAHO &3,~ 
______________ 1 Sheriff 
Ada County, State ofIdaho 
By: J::\ ac0ct ,,-&-=<2 
Deputy Sheriff--5 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
S8. 
County of Ada 
h~ On f this ~ of ) in the year 2011, before me, 
{t..mt:.~ <'lIt/;JIJ'J(LLh Public in and for said state, personally appeared 
ke-u,{ Adrl/W:> ! known to me to be the person whose name is subscribed to the 
foregoing instrument, and acknowledged to me that he/she executed the same. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my l~and and affixed my official seal, 
the day and year in this certificate first above written. 
Resi d ing at---""~--4-.d.L1.ll6.or----r-__ ) Idaho 
My commission expires: {). b I~ I~ 
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EXHIBITB 
· J 
David E. Wishney, I.S.B. #1993 
Chad E. Bernards, I.S.B. #7441 
Attorney and Counselor at Law 
988 S. Longmont, Ste. 100 
P.O. Box 837 
Boise, 1D 83701 
Telephone: (208) 336-5955 
Facsimile: (208) 336·5956 
Attorneys for Washington Federal Savings 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
WASHINGTON FEDERAL SAVINGS. ) 
a United States cOlporation, ) 
) 
Plaintiffs t ) CASE NO. CV OC 09-17209 
) 
vs. ) 
) NOTICE OF SHERIFF'S SALE 
H. CRAIG VAN ENGELEN and KRISTEN ) 




Under and by virtue of a money judgment rendered out of the above-captioned Court. 
which Judgment was entered on the 14th day of Decem bel', 2~10, and the Writ of Execution 
being issue on the 12'l'Hday of May ,2011, in the above-captioned action, wherein the 
above-named Plaintiff Washington Federal Savings obtained a money judgment against the 
above-named Defendants H. Craig Van Engelen and Kristen Van Engelen, jointly and 
NOTICE OF SHERIFF'S SALE ~ Page 1 
~ .. :' .. ~ . . , 
severally, for the sum of$4,996, 101.65, together with an award of attorney's fees and cost 
I 
for the sum 0[$40,897,21, together with post judgment interest in the amount of$111 ,303.40 
being calculated at the statutory rate of 5.375% from December 14,2010 through May 10, 
2011, for a total sum of $Sj148j302.26, together with accruing interests and costs, all of 
which are to be satisfied out ofthe proceeds ofthe claims, causes of action, choses in action, 
defenses andlor affirmative defenses, rights to appeal, and all rights, title, and interest held 
by Defendants H. Craig Van Engelen and Kl'isten Van Engelen in the litigation of 
Washington FederaL Savings, a United States corporation vs. H. Craig Van Engelen and 
Kristen Van Enge1en, Case No. CV 09~17209 in the District Court of the Fourth Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada, including any interest in the 
appeal ofthe foregoing litigation, specifically, any and all rights. title. and interest held by 
H. Craig Van Engelen and Kristen Van Engelen in the matter known as Washington Federal 
Savings, a United States CQrporation vs. H. Cl'aig Van Engelen and Kristen Van Engelen. 
Idaho Supreme COUli Docket No. 38484-2011. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN, that on .....;.T;.;;;.hu.;...:r:...:..s.:c...da'-"-Y _____ > the 7TH day of 
July ,2011, at 9:30 ---'----- o'clock a.m.l~ of said day at the steps of the 
Public Safety' Building located at 7200 Barrister Drive, Boise, Idaho 83704, I will in 
obedience to said Order, and Writ Of Execution, levy upon the claims, causes of action, 
choses in action, defenses andlor affirmative defenses, rights to appeal, and all rights, title, 
and interest held by Defendants H. Craig Van Engelen and Kristen Van Engelen in the 
NOTICE OF SHERIFF'S SALE - Page 2 
. litIgation of Washington Federal Savings, a United States corporation vs. H. Craig Van 
I 
Engelen and Kristen Van Engelen, Case No. CV 09- 17209 in the Distl'ict Court of the Fourth 
Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada, including any interest 
in the appeal oftlle foregoing litigation, specifically, any and all rights, title, and interest held 
by H. Craig Van Engelen a~d Kristen Van Engelen in the matter known as Washington 
Federal 'Savings, a United States corporation vs. H. Craig Van Engelen and Kristen Van 
EngeletJ. Idaho Supreme Court Docket No. 38484-2011, to satisfy the above-referenced 
money judgment, together with all interest thereon and costs of sale. 
June 
DATED THIS 20TH day ofMtty, 2011. 
_G_AR_y_RAN_E_y __________ ,' Shedff 
Ada County, State ofIdaho 
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EXHIBIT C 
Thomas A. Banducci (ISB No. 2453) 
tbanducci@bwsl.awgroup.com . 
Wade L. Woodard (lSB No. 6312) 
wwoodard@b\vslawgroup,com 
Dara Parker (ISB No. 7177) 
dparker@bws!awgl'oup.com 
BANDUCCI WOOPARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC 
802 W. Bannock St.) Suite 500 
Boise, ID 83702 
Telephone: (208) 342-4411 
Facsimile: (208) 342-4455 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
WASHINGTON FEDERAL SAVINGS, a 
United States Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
H. CRAIG VAN ENGELEN and KRISTEN 
VAN ENGELEN, 
Defendants. 
TO: ADA COUNTY SHERlFF'S OFFICE 
ATTN: CIVIL SECTION 
7200 Banister Dr. 
Boise, 10 83704 
Fax (208) 577-3759 
Case No. CV -OC 0917209 
SUPPLEMENTAL CLAIM 
OF EXEMPTION 
In addition to the Claim ofEx~mptioll forwarded to the Ada County· Sheriffs Office 
. I 
directly by Defendants H. Craig Van Engelen and Kristen Van Engelen ("the Van Engelens") 
SUPPLEMENTAL CLAIM OF EXEMPTION - 1 
postmarked June 21, 20~ I, the Van Engelen~ claim exemption from the levy claims, causes of 
I 
action, choose~ in action, defenses andlor affil'inative defenses, rights to appeal, and all rights, 
title, and interest held by them in the litigation of Washington Federal Saving, a United States 
corporation vs. H. Craig Van Engelen and Kristen Van Engeien, Case No. CV OC 09·17209 in 
the District Court of the Fourth Judicial Dis~rict of the State ofIdaho, in and for the County of 
Ada including any interest in the appeal of the foregoing litigation, specifically, any and all 
rights, title and interest held by the Van Engelen defendants in the matter known as Washington 
Federaf Savjngs; a United States corporation vs. H. Craig Van Engelen and Kristen Van Engele~ 
Idaho Supreme Court Docket No .. 38484·2011. 
The Van Engelens request that, as required by Idaho Code, you notify the plaintiff within 
one business day ofthe filing of this claim of exemption. If the plaintiff does not within five (5) 
days following the same, file a motion with the court contesting this claim of exemption, you are 
required to release this property which has been levied upon. Jfthe plaintiff does :file a motion 
. contesting the claim, please refrain from taking any actions upon this property until such time as 
the Court can rule. 
DATED this 21 st day of June, 2011. 
~.~~-
Dam L. Pa ker 
SUPPLElYIENT AL CLAIM OF EXEMPTION - 2 
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN 
Attorneys for Defendants 
EXHIBIT·D 
TERRY C. COPPLE (ISB No. 1925) 
ALEX P. MCLAUGHLIN (ISB No~ 7977) 
DA VIS ON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COPPLE, LLP 
Attorneys at Law 
Chase Capitol Plaza 
Post Office Box 1583 
199 North Capitol Boulevard 
Suite 600 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 342~3658 
Facsimile: (208) 386-9428 
tc@davisoncopple.com 
. mclaughlin@davisoncollple.com 
Attorneys for Defendant Cathy Rose~a 
and DefendantfThird-Party P~aintiff JocCorlett 
TN THE DlSTRlCT COVRT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 






JOE CORLETI, a married person, 
NOTler; OF LEVY - I 


















ANTHONY C. D' ANGELO and JUpy L. ) 
D'ANGELO, husband and wife, and ) 
WHISTLER POINT, LLC, an Idaho: limited ) 
liability company, ) 
) 
Third~Party Defendants. ) 
--------------------------) 
*** 
TO: JAMES M. SMITH, a single person: 
YOU WILL PLEASE T AKB NOTICE that by virtue of an execution issued out of the 
District Court of the Fourth Judicial District for the County of Ada, State of Idaho, in the above-
entitled action, whereby Plaintiff James M. Smith, a single person, owes tne sum of $36,489.41 
now due and owing to Defendant Cathy Rosera and Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff Joe Corlett. 
By virtue of that Supplemental Sum.rrruy Judgment entered on January 15,2010, in this action, I 
have this day levied upon the claims, causes of action and chooses in action held by Plaintiff 
James M. Smith in the litigation of James M. Smith, a single person, vs. Cathy Rosera, 
Defendant. and Joe Corlett, a married person, DefendantfThird-Party Plaintiff, vs. Anthony C. 
D'Angelo and Judy L. D'Angelo, husband and wife, and Whistler Point, LLC, an Idaho limited 
liability company, Third-Party Defendants, _ Case Number CV ot 0809440· pending in the 
District Court of the Fourth Judicial IDistrict of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada, , 
NOTICE OF LEVY· 2 
to satisfy the amount of $36,489.41 due and owing under the foregoing Judgment. 
I tl M:r1~t')' DATED this.....J...L day of ' ,2010. 
~ ~'Sll Sk~~A~ 
K'c< t ~ ~)At-~{ j Y l{ S y-. 
Deputy Sheriff 
NOTICE OF,LEVY ·3 
EXHIB'IT E 
I' 
Bruce S. Bistline, rSB#1988 
GORDON LAW OFFICES, CHTD. 
623 West Hays Street 
Boise, ID 83702-5512 
Telephone: 208-345-7100 
Facsimile: 208-345-0050 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRlCT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JAMES M. SMITH, ) 
) CASE NO. CV OC 0809440 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ) 
) NOTICE OF APPEAL 
JOE CORLETT and CATHY ROSERA, ) 
) Filing Fee: $101.00 
Defendants. ) 
) 
JOE CORLETT, ) 
) 




ANTHONY C. D' ANGELO and JUDY ) 
D' ANGELO, husband and wife, and: ) 
Whistler Point, LLC, an Idaho Limited ) 
Liability Company, ) 
) 
Third Party Defendants. ) 
------------) 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS, JOE CORLETT AND CATHY ROSERA AND 
THE PARTY'S ATTORNEY TERRY C. COPPLE OF DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE & COX, 
LLP, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT. NOTICE IS HEREBY 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
• I , 
GIVEN THAT: 
..•.. ~ 
1. The above named Appellant, James M. Smith, appeals against the above na,med 
Respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Summary Judgment entered upon June 
22,2009, in which the Comt ordered that all claims filed by Plaintiff/Appellant against 
Respondents Corlett and Rosh'a were dismissed with prejudice, which Judgment was 
subject to PlaintiWs Motion to Reconsider that was resolved by the Revised Decision and 
Order Re: Motion for Summary Judgment ofthe Honorable Deborah A. Bail, District 
Judge of the FOU1ih Judicial District, County of Ada, dated September 15 l \ 2009, in 
which the Court denied Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider. 
2. Pursuant to.Rule 11 (a)(l) I.AR.. Appellant has a right to appeal Revised Decision/Order 
described in ~ 1 above to the 'Idaho Supreme Court because the order is a final order in 
that it adjudicates all of the subject matter of the controversy (other than claims for fees 
and costs). 
3. The issue presented on this appeal include but are not limited to: 
a. Whether the District Court erred in holding that Appellant had failed to 
demonstrate the exist6nce of evidence and reasonable inferences to support a 
determination that he had an enforceable commission fee splitting agreement with 
Respondent Rosera aoting on behalf of Respondent Corlett which entitled 
Appellant to receive a: share of the commission in the event that his effOlis lead to 
the sale of the property at issue. 
b. Whether the District Gourt erred in holding that Appellant had failed to 
demonstrate the existence of evidence and reasonable inferences to support a 
determination his effoi'ts lead to the sale of the property at issue. 
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c. Whether the District Court erred in holding that Appellant had failed to 
demonstrate thr exist¢nce of eYiden~e and reasonable inferences to suppOli a 
determination that Respondent Rosera told him a material lie when she 
represented that she had an "exclusive listing" agreement with the seller when in 
fact no such agreement existed. 
d. Whether the District Court erred in holding that Appellant had failed to 
demonstrate the existence of evidence and reasonable inferences to support a 
detennination that Appellant was injured and caused damage by virtue of 
Respondent Rosera's lie. 
e. Whether the District Court erred in holding that Appellant was precluded from 
asserting a fraud claim against Respondent Rosera by virtue of the fact that he had 
no written agreement with Respondent Corlett as required by I.C. § 54-2054(8) 
pertaining to "after-the-fact referral fees." 
f. Whether the District tourt erred in holding that the tort of negligent 
misrepresentation could not properly be extended to the professional relationship 
between two licensed :real estate sales persons. 
4. No evidentiary proceedings were held and a Transcript is not requested. 
5. A standard Clerk's Record as identified in LA.R. 28(b) is requested by Appellant. 
Pursuant to I.A.R. 28(c), Appellant requests that the following additional items be 
forwarded to the Supreme Court to be lodged as exhibits: 
a. Motion for Sununary 1 udgment filed on or about the 8th day of October, 2008. 
b. Brief in Support of Defendarit Joe Corlett's Motion for Summary Judgment filed 
NOTICE OF APPEAL o E}0635 
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on or about the 8th day of October, 2008. 
c. Affidavit of Cathy Rosera filed on or about the 8th day of October, 2008. 
~ 
d. Affidavit of David Dufenhorst filed on 01' about the 10th day of October, 2008. 
e. Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant Corlett's Motion for 
Stunmary Judgment t31ed on or about the 21 51 day of January, 2009. 
f. Affidavit of James M. Smith in Support of Memorandum in Opposition of 
Defendant Corlett's Motion for Summary Judgment filed on or about the 21 51 day 
of January, 2009. 
g. Affidavit of Bruce S.13istline in Support of Memorandum in Opposition of 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment filed on or about the 21 st day of 
January, 2009. 
h. Notice of Filing of the Deposition of David M. Duffenhorst, filed on or about the 
23 rd day of January, 2009. 
L Notice of Filing of the Deposition of Barrett Sigmund, filed on or about the 23 rd 
day of January, 2009. 
j. Supplemental Affidav.it ofeathy Rosera filed on or about the 2nd day of February, 
2009. 
k. Supplement[sic] Brief of Defendant Joe Corlett filed on or about the 2nd day of 
February. 2009. 
l. Affidavit of James M: Smith verifying Plaintiffs Amended Complaint in CV OC 
0901945 tiled on or about the 4th day of February, 2009 
m. Respondent Rosera's Joinder in Motion for Summary Judgment of Joe Corlett. 
filed on our about the 24th day of February, 2009. 
NOT!CE OF APPEAL 
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n. Motion for SUt11mai'yJudgment filed on or about the 12th day of March, 2009. 
o. Affidavit of Cathy Rosera in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment filed on 
i 
or about the 12th day of March, 2009. 
p. Brief in Support of Cathy Rosera's Motion for Summary Judgment filed on or 
about the 12th day of March, 2009. 
q. Plaintiff James Smithi's Response Memorandum to Defendant Cathy Rosera's 
Motion for Summary Judgment filed on or about the 23 rd day of March, 2009. 
r. Affidavit of Paul R. Basom Re: Defendant Rosera's Motion for Summary 
Judgment filed on or about the 23 rd day of March, 2009. 
s. Motion to Reconsidet Decision and Order Re: Motions for Summary Judgment of 
the Defendants Rosera and Corlett filed on or about the 24th day of June, 2009. 
1. Affidavit of James M~ Smith in SUppOlt of Motion to Reconsider filed on or about 
the 24th day of June, 2009. 
u. Affidavit of Bruce S.Bistline in SUppOlt of Motion to Reconsider filed on or 
about the 24th day of June, 2009. 
v. Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider. 
6. To the knowledge of the undersigned nothing was filed under seal and no orders were 
filed sealing any portion of the transcript. 
7. I certify: 
a. That service of this Notice of Appeal has not been made upon the Repolter who 
transcribed any of the proceedings in this matter and no estimated fee has been 
tendered for the prepCiration of a transcript for the reason that no transcript of any 
proceeding has been l:equested. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
b. That the Clerk of the District COllli has been paid the estimated fee for the 
preparation of the Clerk's record in the amount of $100.00. 
c. The appellate filing fee has been paid. 
d. . That, as refleced in the attached Certificate of Service, service has been made on 
all parties as required by LA.R. 20. 
& 
DATED this» day of October, 2009. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
GORDON LAW OFFICES, CHTD. 
By Bruce S. Bistline - Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Plaintiff7 Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
~~~ .' 
r hereby certify that on this _dY_day of October, 2009, I caused the foregoing to be 
delivered by the method indicated below and addressed to the following: 
Teny C. Copple 
Davison, Copple, Copple & Cox, LLP 
Washington Mutual Capitol Plaza 
PO Box 1583 
199 Capitol Blvd, Suite 600 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
William R. Snyder 
Leo p, Shishmanian 
William R. Snyder & Associates, P A 
520 West Franklin Road, Upper Level 
P.O. Box 2338 
Boise, Idaho 83702 













___ i____ --.-____ _ 
\ 
". 
TERRY C. COPPLE (ISB No. 1925) 
ALEX P. MCLAUGHLIN (ISB No. 7977) 
DAVISON, COPPLE, COPPLE &:COPPLE, LL? 
Attorneys at Law 
Chase Capitol Plaza 
Post Office Box 1583 
199 North Capitol Boulevard 
Suite 600 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 342-3658 
Facsimile: (208) 386~9428 
tc@davisoncopple.com 
mclaughlin@davisoncopple.com 
Attorneys for Defendant Cathy Ros,era 
and Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff Joe Corlett 
IN THE DISTRICT C(l)URT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRlCT 
OF THE STATE OF IPAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 






JOE CORLED', a married person, 
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liability company, Third-Party Defendants, Case Number CV OC 0809440 pending in the 
District Court of the Fourth JudiciatDistrict of the State ofIdaho, in and for the County of Ada. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN, that on _T_ll_e_sd_a-"-y ____ • theM/en day of 
_J!JM .... ay'!l-____ , 2010, at ~: 30 o'clock a.m.fp;m. of said day at the steps of the 
Public Safety Building located at 7200 Barrister Drive, Boise, Idaho 83704, I will in obedience 
to said Supplemental Summary Judgment, and Writ Of Execution, I will levy on the described 
claims, causes or action and chooses in action held by Plaintiff James M. Smith to satisfY the 




G_A_R_Y_RAN __ E_Y __________________ ,Sheriff 
Ada County, Idaho 
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Bruce S. Bistline, rSB#1988 
GORDON LAW PFFICES, CHTD: 
623 West Hays Street 
Boise, ID 83702-5512 
Telephone: ~08.345-71 00 
Facsimile: 208-345~OOSO 
Attorneys fot P1aintiff 
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IN THE DISTRlCT CdURT OF TBE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
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JOE CORLETT and CATHY ROSERA, ) 
~ ORbER QUASHING SHERIFF'S 
SALE AND SErnNG MA't'TER FOR 
HEARING IN PLAINTIFFS MOTION TO 
QUASH NOTICE Olf LEVY 
Defendants. 
JOE CORLETT, 
Third party Plaintiff, 
VS. 
ANTHONY C. D'ANGELO and JUDY 
D'ANGELO, husband arid wife,and: 

















Third Party Defendants, ) f&r tk-
--~------- ) / t hli cttl!. ;::::::::---. rl- f 
This matte; having come before the Cour/u.pon Plaintiff's' Motion/or Order 
1 
· . \. 




1'emporaryStcty ofSherijfs Sale cmdMotiotJjor Order Quashing Notice ofLwy and supported by 
the' Affidavit of Bruce S. Bistline ana the Court having reviewed the matter and being fully 
advised in the pretnise~: 
1. It is hereby ordered arid this does order that the Sheriff s sale set, in this action, for 
2. 
:Plainti:ffwish~ to file:a brlefin sup 
brief they must do so a,t least 
DATED this 3td day of May, 2010. 
Order Quashing Sheriff's Sale ~d Setting Matter for Hearing 1n PlaintiffiJ Motion to 
Quash Notice of Levy 
2 
Thomas A. Banducci (ISB No. 2453) 
tbanducci@bwslawgroup.com 
Wade L. Woodard (ISB No. 6312) 
Y\Tlvoodard@bwslawgroup.com 
Dara Parker (ISB No. 7177) 
dparker@bwslawgroup.com 
Banducci Woodard Schwartzman PLLC 
802 W. Bannock St., Suite 500 
Boise, ID 83702 
Telephone: (208) 342-4411 
Facsimile: (208) 342-4455 
Attorneys for Defendants 
NO. ___ --;;;;;;;;;:--__ _ 
~llcD A.M. ____ P.M __ ~_ 
JUl 06 2011 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By JERI HEATON 
DCPUlY 
IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
WASHINGTON FEDERAL SAVINGS, a 
United States Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
H. CRAlG VAN ENGELEN and KRlSTEN 
VAN ENGELEN, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-OC 0917209 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO "WAIVE REQUIREMENT 
OF SUPERSEDEAS BOND AND STAY 
EXECUTION AND/OR EI\TFORCEMENT 
OF THE JUDGMENT 
Defendants H. Craig Van Engelen and Kristen Van Enge1en ("the Van Engelens") submit 
this Memorandum in Support of their Motion to waive the requirement of a supersedeas bond 
, and stay execution and/or enforcement of the judgment pending appeal. 
INTRODUCTION 
As this Court is aware, in the underlying action, it granted summalY judgment in favor of 
Plaintiff Washington Federal Savings ("Washington Federal" or "the Bank") and entered 
judgment in favor of the Bank in the amount M$5,036,998.86. (Amended Judgment, filed 
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JanualY 27,2011.) Because oftheir financial condition, the Van Engelens were unable to post a 
I 
supersedeas bond to stay execution during the pendency of appeal, but have nevertheless 
appealed the judgment to the Idaho Supreme Court. (Notice of Appeal, filed January 25,2011.) 
In another motion currently pending before the Court, Washington Federal is attempting to 
execute upon the Van Engelens' right to appeal in this very case. (Washington Federal's Motion 
Contesting Claim of Exemption, filed June 28, 2011.) Given the Van Engelens' inability to 
afford a supersedeas bond and this attempt to foreclose their right to appeal, this Court shou1d 
grant the Van Engelens' Motion to waive the requirement of a supersedeas bond and stay 
execution of the judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 13-202, after an appeal of a judgment in a civil action, the 
disttict court may stay execution upon that judgment, including waiving the supersedeas bond or 
cash deposit requirements of Idaho Appellate Rule l3(b )(15). Such a waiver of security may be 
granted for "good cause sho\\'ll." I.C. § 13-202(4). Ample "good cause" exists in the present 
case. 
A. The Van Engelens are Unable to Afford a Supersedeas Bond 
The Van Engelens are unable to afford a supersedeas bond or cash deposit, which would 
. ordinarily serve to stay execution on the Court's judgment during the pendency of their appeal to 
the Idaho Supreme Court. I.A.R. 13(b)(15). The Van Engelens were employed as land 
developers for decades. (Affidavit ofH. Craig Van Engelen In Support Of Motion To Waive 
Requirement Of Supersedeas Bond And Stay Execution and/or Enforcement Of The Judgment, ~ 
5.) The economic downturn destroyed their business. (Jd.) As such, they have significant 
liabilities. In addition to the $6 milliop debt owed to Washington Federal Savings which is at 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO WAIVE REQUIREMENT OF SUPERSEDEAS BOND AND 
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issue in this lawsuit, they owed approximately $2 million to Mountain West Bank, $1 million to 
\ 
Home Federal Bank, and at least $13 million to Bank of the Cascades. (Id. at en 6.) They were 
engaged in litigation with Mountain West Bank and Home Federal Bank, but as they had valid 
personal guarantees with those banks and were able to settle by transfening many of their 
remaining business assets. (Id.) The $13 million debt to Bank of the Cascades is still 
outstanding. (Id.) In addition to these liabilities, they have liabilities for other debts in an 
amount exceeding $1 million. (Id. at ~ 7.) These liabilities exceed their very limited remaining 
assets. (Id. at ~ 8.) Moreover, their income has been devastated by the economic downturn. 
They have had no positive income (and in fact, substantial negative income) for the past five 
years. (Id. at 1f 9.) Giventheir financial condition, they knew they would be unable to qualify 
for a supersedeas bond in the amount of $6,850,318.26 or post a cash deposit to cover the 
$5,036,998.86 judgment. (fd. at 1f 10-11.) Their inability to afford such security is now being 
unfairly and unconstitutionally used against them to foreclose their right to appeal the very 
judgment being executed upon. For these reasons, explained in detail below, the COUIt should 
waive the requirement of a supersedeas bond and order a stay of execution. 
\ 
B. Washington Federal is Attempting to Execute Upon the Van Engelens' Right to 
Appeal the Judgment 
The Van Engelens were aware that, without a stay of judgment which they could not 
afford to obtain, Washington Federal could execute upon that judgment during the appeal. 
Nevertheless, they were content in the knowledge that if the Idaho Supreme Court reversed the 
judgment, they would be entitled to a return of their property. As the Idaho Supreme Court has 
long held: 
While it is true that an appeal does not operate to stay the enforcement of a money 
. judgment, no supersedeas bond being given, still it is equally true that an 
execution issued upon such judgment, and all proceedings had thereunder, are 
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dependent for their validity upon the judgm~nt being sustained. If property has 
b~en taken under such execution [lat~r found upon appeal to be invalid], 
restitution must be made. The judgment which alone authorized the garnishment, 
being erroneous, all proceedings had thereunder are, as between the immediate 
parties, ipso facto void and of no effect. 
Radermacher v. Eckert, 63 Idaho 531, 123 P.2d 426, 429 (1942). Then, stunningly, the Van 
EngeIens r;ceived notice that Washington Federal was attempting to execute upon the judgment 
by foreclosing up<?n their right to appeal that very judgment. As outlined in extensive length in 
the Van Engelens' Opposition to the Plaintiffs Motion Contesting Claim of Exemption 
(Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion Contesting Claim of Exemption, filed July 1, 201)), which is 
incorporated herein by reference in its entirely, if such a procedure is allowed in Idaho, the only 
party \vho has the right to appeal a potentially elToneous decision is a party who has enough 
money to post a supersedeas bond. This is a palpably absurd and deeply unjust result that cannot 
stand. The injustice which would flow from Washington's Federal expressly stated intention of 
purchasing (and then dismissing) the appeal of the very judgment upon which it is attempting to 
execute provides ample "good cause" for the Court to waive the requirement of a supersedeas 
bond and order a stay of execution until the Supreme Court has the opportunity to rule upon the 
merits of the appeal. 
C. Requiring a Supersedeas Bond Under the Present Circumstances is an 
Unconstitutional Deprivation of Due Process 
Although fairness alone provides sufficient good cause for the Court to grant the Van 
Engelens' motion, there is an even more compelling reason for doing so: requITing a supersedeas 
bond under these circumstances would be an unconstitutional deprivation of due proces~ under 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Federal Constitution, and Article I Sections 13 and 
14 of the Idaho Constitution. Under both the Federal and Idaho constitutions, states are not 
\ 
required to provide for the right to appeal, Abney v. U S. 431 U.S. 651,656,97 S.Ct. 2034, 
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2038 (1977) and Slate v. Moran-Solo, 150 Idaho 175,244 P.3d 1261 eCt. App. 2010). Once an 
\ 
appellate procedure is provided by a state, however, such procedure must meet the constitutional 
requirements of due process. Dowdv. United States ex rel. Cook;340 u.s. 206, 71 S.Ct. 262, 95 
L.Ed. 215 (1951); Gardner v. State, 91 Idaho 909, 435 P.2d 249 (1967). "The elements ofthe 
constitutional guaranty of due process in its procedural aspect are notice and an opportunity to be 
heard or defend before a competent tribunal in an orderly proceeding adapted to the nature of the 
case." Foster v. Walus, 81 Idaho 452,456,347 P.2d 120, 122 (1959). In fact, due process 
requires that, once the state has created a right of appeal, it must "offer each defendant a fair 
opportunity to obtain an adjudication on the merits of his appeal." Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 
841,105 S.Ct. 830, 840, 83 L.Ed.2d 821 (19~5). 
If requiring a supersedeas bond would interfere with that right, then it constitutes a 
deprivation of due process. The case Texaco Inc. v. Penzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133, (2d Cir. 1986) 
overruled on procedural grounds, 481 U.S. 1 (1987), is illustrative of this point. In that case, 
Pennzoil obtained a judgment against Texaco in the sum of $11.12 billion. As in Idaho, a Texas 
rule provided that, in order to stay execution during the pendency of an appeal, Texaco would be 
required to post a supersedeas bond in the amount of the judgment plus other costs. As the 
supersedeas bond exceeded $12 billion, it was impossible for Texaco to meet the bond 
requirement without causing illiquidity and bankruptcy. The Second Circuit held that under 
. . 
these circumstances, the Texas bonding requirement so undermined the effectiveness of any 
appeal that it wa:;; a violation of due process. Id. at 1154. The present case is even mqre 
compelling. In Texaco v. Penzoil, Texaco's inability to afford a supersedeas bond merely made 
the appeal futile. Here, the Van Engelens' inability to afford a supersedeas bond will cause them 
to lose the right entirely. See also Pleasant v. Evers, 1998 WL 205431 (E.D.Pa.,~998) 
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(supersedeas bond requirement, as applied to indigent tenants unable to enter the necessary 
~ 
security, violates procedural and substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution.) 
In this case, under Washington Federal's interpretation of the execution statutes, the only 
way for the Van Engelens to preserve their right to appeal would be to post a cash deposit or 
supersedeas bond to secure over $5 million, which they cannot afford. As such, the bonding 
requirement interferes with their right to appeal in violation of due process under the Federal and 
Idaho Constitutions. Under these circumstances, there is more than sufficient good cause for the 
Court to waive the requirement of a supersedeas bond and order a stay of execution until the 
Supreme Court has the opportunity to rule upon the merits of the appeaL Indeed, the Court must 
do so in order to preserve the Van Engelens' constitutional rights. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, the Van Engelens respectfully request this Court to waive the 
requirement of a supersedeas bond and order a stay of execution of the judgment until the 
Supreme Court has the opportunity to rule upon the merits of the appeal. 
DATED this 6th day of July, 2011. 
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHW ARTZNrAl'J PLLC 
~, I'R~~ 
Dara L. Par¥er 
- Attorneys for Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 6th day of July, 2011, a true and correct copy ofthe 
'within and foregoing instrument was served upon: 
David E. Wishney 
Attorney and Counselor at Law 
988 S. Longmont; Ste. 100 
P.O. Box 837 
Boise, Ib 83701 
D U.S. Mail 
r2J Facsimile (208) 336-5956 
D Hand Delivery' . . 
D Overnight Delivery 
ara L. Park{f 
'. 
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From: 5956 Page: 19/31 Date: 7115/2011 1 PM 
David E. Wisbney, I.S.B. #1993 
Chad E. Bernards, IS.R #7441 
Attorneys and Counselors at Law 
988 S. LQngmont, Ste. 100 
P.O. Box 837 
Boise, ill 83101 
Telephone: (208) 336-5955 
Fax: (208) 336-5956 
Attorneys for PlaiIitUfWashlngtoil Federal Savings 
IN THE DiSTRICT COURT OF tHE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO; IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
W ASHlNGTON FEDERAl SAVINGSt 
a United States Corporation, 
Pla.i1itiff, 
vs. 
H. CRAIG VAN ENG-ELEN and r<:ruSTEN 














CASE NO. CV OC 0917209 
MEMORANDliM IN 
OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO 
WAIVE REQUIREMENT OF 
SUPERSEDEAS BOND AND 
STAY EXECUTION AND/OR 
ENFORCEMENT OF THE 
JtJbGMENT 
coMES NOW the Plaintiff, WASHINGTON FEDERAL SAVINGS f'Washington 
Federal"), by and through its counsel of record, and Submits this Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendants; Motion to Waive Reqllirement of Supersedeas Bond and Stay Execution and/or 
Enforcement of Judgment (herein "Defendants' Motiart). 
MEMORAN"DUl\1 IN OPPOSITIoN TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO WAIVE REQUIREMENT OF 
SUPERSEDEAS BOND AND STAY EXECUTION AND/OR ENFORCEMENT OF' THE JUDGMENT - 1 
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I. 
RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
The undisp"\lted factS releVailt for the purposes ofllie Defendants' MotIon are as follows: 
1. OilN ovembet 12, 2010, this Co1lrt gtanted Plaintifr s Motion for Summary Judgment 
against the individual Defendants and a money ju,dginent in the amount of $4,996,101.65 was 
entered on December 14, 2010. After application for and the entry of an order for fees and costs in 
favor of Washington Federal, an Amended Judgment in the amount of$5!036,998.86 'WaS entered 
on January 27,2011 (hereInafter "Judgment"). 
Z. On or about December 16,2010, by way bfletter from the Defendants' counsel, 
Defendants requested that Washington Federal waive the supersedeas bond requirement in order to 
stay execution of the Judgment. W ashingtonF ederal Sllbsequently declined to waive the supersedeas 
bond. 
3. On January 25, 201 1, Defendants' filed a Notice of Appeal from the Court's granting 
ofWashiri~on Federal's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
4. On:rv1ay 12.2011, a Writ of Execution was issued. Thereafter, Washington Federal' s 
counsel prepared a letter of instruction to the Ada County Sheriff requesting the Sheriff to levy upon 
and sell all claims, «a uses of action. choses in action, defenses andJof affirmative defenses, rights 
to appeal, and all rights, titlE}, and interest held by the Defendantsl Appellants in the above-entitled 
action (collectively H Appeal Rights"). Following levy ~ a Sheriff's sale of the Appel:11 Rights was set 
for July 7,201 L 
5. On June 21, 2011, the D~fendants filed a Clairti of Exemption and Supplemental 
Cl~ of Exemption, wherein the Defeildants asserted that the Appeal Rights were exempt from 
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levy. 
6. Oh Jime 28, 2011, Washhigton Federal filed a motioh and supporting memorandum 
contesting the Defertdants' claim. of exemption with respect to the App~ Rights, and the matter was 
noticed for hearing before this Court for July 7; 2011. 
1. Ort July 6, 2011. Def~ndarits fIled a motion, along with supporting affidavit and 
memorandum, to (i) waive requitement of a supersedeas bond; and (ii) stay execution andlor 
enforcement of the judgment ("Joint Motion"). 
8. On July 7, 2011, the District Court took up Waslri.ngton Federal.' s motion contesting 
the Defendants' claim of exemption regatding the Appeal R.ights. At said hearing, the Court 
reserved ruling on the same until Defendants' Joint MotioIi. eouId be heard. The District Court set 
a briefing sch€:dule fot Washington Federal's response brief (July 15;, :W 11) and Defendants' reply 
brief (July 22,2011). The Joint Motion is currently set for hearing on August 4,2011. 
9. To date. the Defendants have poster neither a ~h deposit or supersedeas bond to 
stay execution or emorcement of the Judgment. 
10- to date, the Defendants have paid nothing on the Judgment. 
II. 
PRQCEDUR.A.L mstoRY OF SMITH v CORLETTE & ROSERA 
Initially~ in response to the Coprt's inquiry regarding th~ results of the Smith v. Corlett and 
Rosera matter, (Ada County District Co\lrt Case No. CV OC 2008-09440; Supreme Court Docket 
No. 37060-2009), a review of the Court files reveals the following procedUral history: 
,; On September 15,2009, (after a motion for reconsideration was filed), the District 
Court entered a revised decision and ordet on summary judgment reaftrrrning the 
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Court's earlier dismissal ofS:r:p.ith's daims against Rosera. 
On October 23, 2009, Smith appe1'!1ed to the idaho Supreme Court. 
• Oh December 16, 2Q09, the District Cour!: entered its decision and order granting 
Rosera's request for attorney's fees and costs in the sum of $36,392.04. 
• Pursuant to a writ of execution the Ada County Sheriff to levied upon Smith's choses 
in action; including Smith's appeal rights, and a Sheriff's sale set for May 4,2010. 
• On May 3, 2010, Smith flIed an ex-parte motion for order temporarily staying the 
May 4th Sheriff s sale and a motion for order quashing the notice 'of levy. 
• Following a telephonic hearing on May 3; 2010. the District Court entered an Order 
staying the execution sale pending further order of the Court. 
.. On May 18, 2010; SIliith filed a motion with the District Court to stay execution as 
to Smith's causes of action against Rosera. 
• Following a hearing held on June 9, 2010, the District Court entered an Order on 
June 10,2010, granting Smith's motion to stay executiorl'and to quash the levy.l 
• On June 16, 2010, Roseta filed an application with the Supreme Court to vacate the 
stay imposed by the District Court. 
.. Oii JUi1e 30, 2010, Smith filed with the Supreme Court (1) an application for order 
staying execution as to Smith's rights; and (2) a memotMdum in response to 
Rosera's application to vaCl;l1e the District Court's stay order. 
1 See Affidavit of Counsel, Ex. 1 attached thereto. 
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• On September 22, 2010) the !daho Supreme Court ent(rred an order granting Rosera' s 
application to vacate the District CQurt's stay otder.2 
• The Sheriff's €xecution sale was re-scheduled for February 10,2011. 
• On January 24,2011, Smith flled with the Idaho Supreme Court: (1) an application 
to stay the February 10, 2011 Sheriff's sal€; (2) a second appUcation to stay the 
Sheriff's sale and all attempts to execute upon the judgment and levying upon 
Smith's rights in the action; and (3) a verified application for waiver of bond on the 
grounds ofiIi.digence, and supporting memorandum. 
On January 28 , 2011, Rosera filed objections to Srrrlth.' s stay applications and request 
for bond waiver. 
.. On January 31, 2011, the Supreme Court entered an Order Denying Application for 
Stay filed by Smith? 
.. At the February 1 O~ 2011 execution sale. Ros(:Jra and Corlett purchased Smith's 
"chases in action", including Smith's appeal rights in the underlying action, for a 
credit bid in the $unl of $500.00.4 
• On February 11, 2011. Rosera filed a motion to dismiss Smith's appeal, which was 
followed by Smith's objection to the same. 
2 See Affidavit of Counsel, Ex.2 attached thereto. 
3 See Affidavit of Counsei; Ex.3 tittached thereto. 
4 See Affidavit of Counsel, Exs. 4 and 5 attached thereto. 
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On March 8) 2011; the Idaho Supreme Court entered an Order granting Rosera's 
motion to dismiss Smith's appeal.s 
It should be noted that review of the ldaho Supreme Court :file on this matter reveals, as 
confirmed by a Deputy Clerk, that the Court's Orders vaca~ the District Court's stay and denying 
Smith's applications to stay execution and bond waiver, were indeed reviewed and voted upon by 
the Justices of the Court, and were not merely actions of the Co\lrt Clerk. 
ID. 
ARGUMENT 
1. The ReqUirement Qf a Supersedeas Bond is Not an Unconstitutional 
Deprivation of Due Process. 
The Fourteenth Aniendment to the United S~te Constitution provides that no person shall 
be deprived oflife.lib~, or property without due ptocess oflaw. U.S. CaNST. amend. XIV. 
First, it shoUld be noted that the Defendants' due process argument, :in and ofitself. concedes that 
their appeal rights in this case is property unc;l~r Idaho law subject to levy and sale. Said differently) 
if no property right exists in the first instance" then it necessarily follows that there could be no 
deprivation of due process in thE} taking of (non-existent) property. SecoIid, the 14th Amendment to 
the United States Constitution, as clearly stated in its text, do'?s not prohibit the taking of property. 
Rather. it only prohibits the taking of property without due process. 
Due process is both procedural and substantive in nature. Rammell v. Idaho State Dept. of 
Agriculture, 147 Idaho 415, ---' 210 P.3d 523, 528 (2009). Generally, as long a,s the party is 
5 See Affidavit of COU:ilsel~ Exs. 6 and 7 attached tliereto. 
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afforded an opporttmity to be heard "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner" due process 
requirements are met. fd. Procedural due pro~ss requires some process to be in piace to ensute that 
ali individual's rights are not arbitrarily deprived in violation of the state or federal Constitutions. 
Aberdeen.,springfieidCanal Co. v. Peiper, i33 Idaho 82, 91, 982P.2d917, 926(1999). The concept 
of dtle proceSs is a flexible cOncept, not to be applied rigidly; calling for procedural protection 
warranted by particular situations. fd 
Tl:ie relevant process in the case at bar involves Idaho; s levy :md execution procedures. As 
previously briefed at length in WasltingtonFederaP s Mt;m1orandum in Support ofPlaintifr s Motion 
Cont~ti:hg Defendants' Claim of Exelliption, Id~o law permits non-exempt property (including 
'1hings in action';) to be seized and levied upon.. The Defendants' are then afforded the opportunity 
to file a clainis of exemption for eXeIDllt property. Pursuant to Idaho law, Washington Federal then 
filed its motion contesting the Defenda,nts' claim of exemption. Ifind.eed this Court rules that the 
Defendants' appeal rights are not exempt under Idaho law, then Washington Federal can proceed 
with the Sherriffs sale, at which the Defendants themselves ate a110wed to bid. If Washington 
Fed~ or a third-parl:y outbid the l)efendants, then said appeal rights will no longer be owned. by 
the befehdants. While this may be to the Defenciants~ det:t:U:ilent, it will not be the result of 
inadequate process. Accordingly, there is no deriial of procedural due process in the instant case. 
While not specifically delineated in their memorandum, Defendants' due process argument 
appears to raise questions of a substantive pature. Substantive due process embraces the right of 
persons to be free "from arbitrAfY deprivations oflife, liberty, or property." State v. Reed. 107 Idaho 
162, 167~ 686 P.2d 842.841 (et. App. 1987) (etnphasis added). 
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ill support of their due process argument, the Deft;ndlmts' rely heavily upon Texaco Inc. v. 
Penzoil Co., 184 F.2d 1133 (2d Cir. 1986) for the proposition that the requitement of a supersedeas 
bond to stay execution of a judgment deprives them of due process Simply because they are too poor 
to afford one. Glarlngiy absent from the Defendants' citation to TeXaco is the fact that the Court 
ultimately held that the U,S. District C?'urt did hot err in requir:big Texaco to post $1 billion in 
security. Texaco 784 F.2d 1133 at 1157 <"We also conclude that the issuance of preliminary 
mjunctive relief and requirement of $1 billion security as a condition thereof did not constitute an 
abuse of disctetion."). In fact, the Texaco Court held that the Texas lien and bond pfGvisions were 
only unconStitutional as.applied. Id 
The Texaco Court's ruling was very fact specific to the unique and extraordinary 
circumstances involved therein. as reflected iIi the following excerpts: 
We hasten to note that our decision tests partly upon the extraordinary circumstances 
of this case, which are unlikely ever ~ain to occur .• , Id at 1150. 
[O]urs is a narrow holding limited to the uilusual circumstances of this case. The 
Texas lien and bond provisioIis will in most other circumstances continue to be 
respected ~d enforcf'{d as written by the Texas legislature and the Texas Supreme 
Court. Thus our decision does not prevent the state from enforcing the policy behind 
the TexaS lien and bond provisions, which is to insure that a judgment creditor's 
interest itt a judginent will be protected duri:rigthe pendency of an app~. Id at 1157. 
The extraordinary circumstances presented in this case included the shying away of suppliers, 
joint venturers, and pll1"chasers of'Texaco assets, downgrading of Texaco; s bonds, its withdrawal 
from the commercial paper market, and ali inability to secure financing from lending institutions 
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with which it had historied business relations. Id at 1139; 1152.6 In essence Texaco would come 
to a standstill and its operations would completely shut down which results would "be catastrophic 
fotthousands ofTexaqo employe¢.s, stockholders and suppliers located throughout the United States 
and wotld-wide and would threaten serious harm to the national ~conomy and the public." ld at 
1140. 
Simply stated, the €}xtraordinary cirCUIhstances and potential catastrophic results existing in 
the Texaco case are not present here. Moreover. and notwithstanding the unprecedented 
circumstances presented in Texaco, the Court still permitted a $1 billion bond to stand in order to 
meet the purposes behind the requirt}meht of supersede;;lS bond. in parttq protect judgment creditors 
as much as possiblt? nle Texaco Court opined that "A full supersedeas bond may be required 
'where there is some reasonable likelihood of the judgment debtor's inability ot upwilHngness to 
satisfy the judgrtlent in full upon ultimate disposition of the case and where posting adequate security 
is practicable'. whereas no bond or a reduced bond would suffice when the creditor's interest, due 
to unusual circumstances) would not be unduly endangt;red." ld. at 1154-55 (cite omitted) .. 
The Texaco Court went on to state that there was no teal dispute that Texaco could liquidate 
its assets to pay the judgment in full and that Penzoil's interest in protecting the full amount of its 
6 At the hearing upou Texaco's application for preliminary relieffrorn execution upon the 
judgment, the U.S. District Court took evidence into consideration in ruling upon the irt~parable injury 
and devastating impact that would result in the event the injunction was not granted. In stark contrast, 
the Van Engelens have proviq.ed no evidence to suggest that catastrophiy consequences would result 
should they not be able to post the required bond. or cash deposit (other than their claim of povelty). In 
faCt, any injury should be minhniz¢-q. in light of their assertion that exclusive of Washington Federal's 
judgment, they have liabilitie!; excf)eding $14 million with no way to pay for the same. Said differently, 
based upon Defendants' admitted financial circumstances, their liabilities totaling $14 milHon (exclusive 
of Washington FederaP s juq.gment) and $19 millioIi plus (inclusive of th~ judgment) are of no 
cbnsequenc;e as they are financially onable t6 servic~ C?ither debt amount. 
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judgment was reasonably secured by the substantial excess of Texa,co' s net worth over and above 
the amount ofPenioil' s judgment. Id at 1155. Here, the Defendants admit that (I) their liabilities 
far exceed their very limited remain:ing aSsets; (2) they transferred many of the it remaining assets 
to satisfy debts with Mountain West Bank and. Home F~eral Bank; (3) they have additional 
Habillties for other debts exceeding $14 million; ap.d (4-) they have had negative iilcome for the past 
five years.7 Thus, Wasbington Federal has no reasonable likelihood of collecting upon its judgment 
by the Defendants' own adrhission, thereby defeating any purpose iIi reducing the full su.persedeas 
amount. 
Further, according to Texaco, it is not reversible error for a district court to. reduce a bond 
requirement amount to afford ajudgment creditor some reasonable li.k:J?lihood of recovering at least 
a portion of its judgment. In any event, th~ Texaco Court d.o~s not hold for the position that a 
supersedeas bond requirement staying execution upon a judgmellt rises to a deprivatio.n of due 
process under the facts presented in the instant case. Co.ntrarily, as cited above. the bond 
requirement is to be respected and enfurced as written "in most other circumstances." 
Herein; the Defendants argue strenuously that a judgment credito.r should not be pennitted 
to execute upon the appeal rights of the jl,ldg:tnent debtor in the saIDe ~ction. This argument suggests 
that the judgment creditor {Washington Federal} should be treated differently than. a third party 
judgment creditor who levies upon and sells the same Appeal Rights. (While the market for such 
rights might be limited; they would have obvio.us "avoidance cost'; value to. Washingtoli Federal 
7 See Affidavit ofB. Craig Van Engelen supporting Defendants' Motion to Waive 
Requirement of Supersed~as Bond and Stay Execution and/or Enforcement of the Judgment, ~ 
6~ 1, & and 9. 
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because it would be relieved of (a) the expense of appeal, and (b) the risk of an adverse decision 
upon appeal resulting in additional expense at the District Court level), If the actions of a third party 
judgment oreditoI did n.ot 'Violate principles of due process, then why would Washington Federal's 
intended course of a¢tion violate slloh principles? The analysis urged by the Defendants, lends itself 
to a resUlt that is focused on the identITy of the parties involved and not upon the process involved. 
While Washington Federal is aware of case law in other jurisdictions permitting execution upon an 
opponent's appeal rights, it is unaware of any rulings finding a violation of due ptocess under the 
facts as presently before the Court Neither a prooedural nor substantive due process right is 
implicated in requiring the Defendants to post a supersedeas bo.pd to stay execution of the judgment. 
Therefore, the Defendants' motion to stay execution of the judgment should be denied. 
2. Good Cause Does Not Exists for the Court to W~ive the R~quitemeDt of a 
Supersedeas Bond. 
The Defendants' claim for "good cause"boils do'Wil to their dilini of poverty. the fmancial 
inability, in and of itself, is not su:ffici~nt cause to waive the supersedeas bond reqlrirement. If this 
were the case, Who wouldn't qualify for such a waiver. While the Defendants' have asserted 
conclusory statements that they have very limited assets, they fail to provide the Court with any 
specifics on their remaining assets. g In essence, the Court is being asked to waive an appeal bond 
without full disclosure. If the Court fmds that a judgment debtot can simply side step the bond 
requirement by claiming "no money';, 1110St, if not aU, judgment debtors with sizable judgments can 
avoid posting a bond. which in tum.. negates the pUrposes behind the bond requirement in protecting 
ju~ament debtors and providing security in collection upon their Judgment Aocorcling~ good cause 
& ld. 
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does not exist for the Court to waive befendants' bond requirement. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons outlined above~ Washington Federal requests this Court deny Defendants' 
motions to waive the supersedeas bond requirement and stay execution and/or enforcement of the 
judgment. 
Respectfully submitted this (5 day of July. 2011. 
C~:}?CZ~~" -
ChadE. Bemar~ 
Attorney for the Plaintiff 
Washington Federal 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
WASHINGTON FEDERAL SAVINGS, a 
United States Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
H. CRAIG V AN ENGELEN and KRlSTEN 
VAN ENGELEN, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV -OC 0917209 
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDAl'l'T'S 
MOTION TO WAIVE REQUIREMENT 
OF SUPERSEDEAS BOND AND STAY 
EXECUTION AND/OR ENFORCEMENT 
OF THE roDGMENT 
Defendants H. Craig Van Engelen and Kristen Van Engelen ("the Van Engelens") submit 
this reply in support of their Motion to waive the supersedeas bond and stay execution and/or 
enforcement of the Judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
As this Court is aware, during the pendency of an appeal, a district court may stay 
execution of a judgment and waive the requirement of all security, for any "good cause shown." 
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I.C. § 13-202(4), As demonstrated in the Van Engelens' previous briefing, ample good cause 
exists. Each of the Van Engelens arguments is informed by one bizarre fact: Washington 
Federal Savings ("Washington Federal" or "the Bank") has admitted its intention to use Idaho's 
execution process to foreclose the Van Engelens' right to appeal the very judgment being 
executed upon. Under these circumstances, requiring the Van Engelens to post security that they 
cannot afford will result in the loss of their right to appeal, which would do violence to the 
purpose of the Idaho execution statutes, doctrines of due process, and basic principles of fairness 
and justice. 
A. Requiring a Supersedeas Bond Under These Circumstances is Unjust 
Good cause exists for waiving security and staying enforcement of the judgment under 
the bizarre circumstances of this case for simple reasons of fairness, justice, and the orderly 
administration'of the legal process. I The Tenth Circuit case RklA Ventures California v. 
SunAmerica Life Ins. Co., 576 F.3d 1070 (lOth Cir. 2009/ ably explains the unfairness which 
would result if Washington Federal is allowed to execute upon a judgment by forcing the sale of 
the Van Engelens' right to appeal that ju~gment: 
As a matter of public policy, I doubt the wisdom of a rule that readily places the 
right to appeal on an auction block. More troublesome still is a rule permitting a 
[judgment creditor) to purchase its opponent's appellate rights, thereby 
I Washington Federal spends several pages outlining the procedural history of the Idaho case 
Smith v. Corietfe (Ada County District Court Case No. CV OC 2008-09440; Supreme COUli 
Docket No. 37060-2009.) While that case has some similar features to the present case, nothing 
can be infened about its conclusion, a bare, unpublished order dismissing the appeal signed by 
the clerk of the Supreme Court. That order, which contains no analysis, has no precedential 
value. It cannot be inferred that the Supreme Court has or would approve of the procedure of 
foreclosing on the right to appeal in order to satisfy the judgment that is the very issue of the 
appeal. The Court should therefore disregard Washington Federal's citation to this unpublished 
order. 
2 This case was described at length in the Van Engelens' Motion Contesting Claim of 
Exemption, which they incorporated by reference into the present Motion. 
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extinguishing a ... claim. "[A judgment creditor] obviously has no intention to 
litigate a claim against itself." Snow, Nuffer, Engstrom & Drake v. Tanasse, 980 
P.2d 208, 211 (Utah 1999). Today's decision thus incentivizes [a judgment 
creditor] to attempt an end run around merits determinations by purchasing [its 
opponent's] right to appeal. This incentive is at its zenith when it is most 
offensive-in those cases in which a [judgment creditor] believes it would likely 
lose the merits appeal. ... 
Rl'vfA Ventures California, 576 F.3d at 1076 (Lucro, Circuit Judge, concurring). 
If the Court requires security or declines to stay execution, this will allow Washington 
Federal to use the Idaho execution statutes in a way that is not consistent with the purpose of 
those statutes. The reason that the Idaho execution statutes allow a judgment creditor to 
purchase a "thing in action," I.e. § 11-301, is so that the judgment creditor can "step into the 
shoes" of the judgment debtor and realize the benefit that the judgment debtor would have 
received from that case. 3 The Idaho execution statutes are not designed to extinguish causes of 
action, but to allow a judgment creditor to seize property so that its judgment can be satisfied. 
Williams v. Paxton, 98 Idaho 155, 157,559 P.2d 1123, 1125 (1976) (party was entitled to a writ 
of execution to satisfy his judgment). That is not the result that Washington Federal is seeking. 
Washington Federal is seeking to extinguish any opportunity for the Van Engelens to challenge 
3 Washington Federal asks why it should be treated differently from a typical third party creditor, 
who may execute on a separate judgment by foreclosing on "things in action" without running 
afoul of due process. (Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Waive Requirement 
of Supersedeas Bond and Stay Execution and/or Enforcement of the Judgment, p. 10-11.) The 
answer is simple: a third party creditor is not executing on the right to appeal the very judgment 
being executed upon. A third pmiy creditor does not, as stated in Ril,tfA Ventures California, 576 
F.3d at 1076, present "a classic chicken-and-egg dilemma" by"extinguish[ing] [judgment 
debtor's] right to appeal the very merits determination that served as the predicate 'for the 
subsidiary judgment in the first place." Washington Federal is not like an ordinary third party 
creditor using the execution statutes to satisfy a separate judgment, which is still subject to 
appeal in the other case (and which execution would be undone if the judgment was ultimately 
reversed, Radermacher v. Eckert, 63 Idaho 531, 123 P.2d 426, 429 (1942).) Rather, it is using the 
execution procedure to extinguish the ability to challenge the very judgment upon which the 
execution is based. It is that fact which makes Washington Federal's attempt to execute on a 
"thing in action" a violation of due process, as will be explained in more detail below. 
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the judgment. This is palpably absurd and deeply unjust, and provides more than ample reason 
for the COUlt to waive security and stay execution during the pendency of the appeal. 
B. Requiring a Supersedeas Bond Under These Circumstances is an Unconstitutional 
Deprivation of Due Process 
More significantly, requiring security or declining to stay execution of the judgment 
under these circumstances would be an unconstitutional deprivation of Due Process under the 
Fifth and Fourteen Amendments of the Federal Constitution, and Article I Section 13 and 14 of 
the Idaho Constitution. Due Process has been construed to mandate that all citizens shall enjoy 
free and open access to the courts of the United States. Armstrong v. }vJanzo, 380 U.S. 545,552, 
85 S. Ct. 1187, 1191 (1965). It requires that the opportunity to obtain access to the courts be 
granted to all litigants "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." ld. When a state 
provides a procedure for appeal, due process requires that litigants have "a fair opportunity to 
obtain an adjudication on the merits of his appeal." Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 841, 105 S. 
Ct. 830, 840 (1985) (emphasis added). The avenues of appeal "must be kept free of unreasoned 
distinctions than can only impede open and equal access to the courts." Williams v. Oklahoma 
City, 395 U.S. 458, 460,89 S. Ct. 1818, 1819 (1969). As the Supreme Couli has said, 
"[ d]estitute defendants must be afforded as adequate appellate review as defendants who have 
money." Griffin v. fliinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18, 76 S. Ct. 585,591 (1956) (holding that due process 
was violated by failing to provide transcript to indigent criminal defendant). Due process "is not 
a concept to be applied rigidly in every matter. Rather, it 'is a flexible concept calling for such 
procedural protections as are warranted by the particular situation.'" Aberdeen-Springfield Canal 
Co. v. Peiper, 133 Idaho 82, 91, 982 P.2d 917,926 (1999) (quoting City ofBoise~v. Industrial 
Comm 'n, 129 Idaho 906, 910, 935 P .2d 169, 173 (1997). The particulars of this situation require 
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the court to waive the supersedeas bond and stay execution in order to protect the Van Engelens' 
due process rights. 
Washington Federal first contends that Idaho's levy and execution procedures provide 
sufficient procedural process. (Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Waive 
Requirement of Supersedeas Bond and Stay Execution and/or Enforcement of the Judgment, 
p.7.) As noted above, Due Process requires an oppOltunity to be heard "at a meaningful time 
and in a meaningful manner," Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co., 133 Idaho at 91, 982 P.2d at 926, 
and "a fair opportunity to obtain an adjudication on the merits of [an] appeal." Evitts, 469 U.S. 
at 841, 105 S. Ct. at 840 (emphasis added). Under the circumstances of this case, Idaho's levy 
and execution statutes are the very source of the problem. It is for this reason that the Van 
Engelens have requested relief from this process. Washington Federal's reliance on the 
"process" supposedly afforded by the levy and execution procedure fails to take into account that 
Washington Federal is attempting to execute upon the right to appeal the very judgment upon 
which the execution is based. As Washington Federal has stated its intention to purchase and 
then dismiss the appeal of that very judgment, the execution process is being used to forestall 
any review of the merits ofthe judgment. Unless the execution and levy process is forestalled by 
this court, the Van Engelens will be deprived of "a fair 0ppOliunity to obtain an adjudication on 
the merits of [their] appeal," Evitts, 469 U.S. at 841, 105 S. Ct. at 840 (emphasis added), the 
very definition of a Due Process violation. 
Contrary to Washington Federal's attempts to distinguish the case, Texaco Inc. v. Penzoil 
Co., 784 F.2d 1133 (2d Cir. 1986) overruled onprocedurai grounds, 481 U.S. 1 (1987) clearly 
demonstrates that a supersedeas bond requirement that interferes with a meaningful appeal 
constitutes a deprivation of due process. As explained more fully in the V fin Engelens' initial 
REPL Y IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WAIVE REQUIREMENT OF 
SUPERSEDEAS BOND AND STAY EXECUTION AND/OR ENFORCEMENT OF THE 
JUDGMENT- 5 
briefing, relief in that case was sought from a bond requiring security for $12 billion. The Court 
held that: 
enforcement of the Texas lien and bond requirements against Texaco's property to 
the extent of $12 billion lacks any rational basis, since it would destroy Texaco 
and render its right to appeal in Texas an exercise in futility. This would at least 
amount to a deprivation of its propelty in violation of its right to due process 
under the' Constitution. 
Jd at 1145. As the Court further explained, "[i]t is self-evident that an appeal would be futile if, 
by the time the appellate court considered his case, the appeal had by application of a bonding 
law been robbed of any effectiveness." Id at 1154. In the present case, the situation is even 
more dire. Unless the bonding requirement is waived, the Van Engelens' appeal will not be 
merely futile, but entirely abrogated. See Hemy v. First National Bank o/Clarksdale. 595 F.2d 
291, 305 (5 th Cir. 1979) (enjoining the execution of a state court judgment for $1.25 million in 
damages during the pendency of an appeal when supersedeas bond would bankrupt judgment 
debtor); Trans World Airlines v. Hughes, 515 F.2d 173 (2nd Cir. 1975) (noting that "[i]f a 
defendant has to liquidate all or a substantial part of his business in order to exercise the right of 
appeal, then the appeal may surely be of doubtful value"); Pleasant v. Evers, 1998 WL 205431 
* 1, (E.D. Pa. 1998) (supersedeas bond requirement, as applied to indigent tenants unable to enter 
the necessary security, violated procedural and substantive due process under the FOUlieenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.) 
Washington Federal attempts to distinguish Texaco because that court did require the 
posting of some bond, reducing the requirement from $12 billion to $1 billion. The fact that the 
Texaco court ultimately determined that a multi-billion dollar corporation could .and should post 
some measure of a bond does not alter the due process analysis. As Washington Federal itself 
admits, Texaco stands for the proposition that the lien and bond provisions at issue in that case 
I . 
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were unconstitutional "as applied." (Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to 
Waive Requirement of Supersedeas Bond and Stay Execution andlor Enforcement of the 
Judgment, p. 8.) They are likewise unconstitutional "as applied" here. 
·Washington Federal also argues that the Couii should not rely on Texaco because it is 
based on "extraordinary circumstances," including the fact that that a bond would cause 
catastrophic results to a major company and thereby harm many other individuals. The 
"extraordinary circumstances" referenced by the COUli in Texaco, were: 
(1) "a private civil money judgment in an amount unprecedented in the annals 
of legal history," 
(2) "a clear inability on the pmi of the judgment debtor to comply with a state 
law mandating a bond in the full amount of the judgment pending appeal," 
(3) "the prospect that the state appellate court would not rule on the 
constitutionality of the state law before the judgment creditor acted to 
enforce the judgment,,,4 and 
(4) "likelihood that immediate enforcement of the lien and bond provisions 
would lead to irreversible destruction of the debtor before its appeal could 
be heard and decided on the merits, thus robbing its right of appeal of any 
meaning and effect. ,,5 
Texaco, 784 F.2d at 1157. All of these circumstances, save the first, exist in this case. Moreover, 
the third and fourth factors are even stronger. There is a serious risk in this case that the Idaho 
Supreme Court will never have the opportunity to rule on the constitutionality of the procedure 
that Washington Federal is attempting. If this Court declines to stay execution, the 
Van Engelens will obviously attempt to appeal that decision, but nothing would stop Washington 
4- The precise posture of this third factor is not relevant to the present case, as the Texaco court 
was enjoining a state comi judgment. Similar to that that issue, however, is the prospect in this 
case that the Supreme Court will not have the opportunity to rule on the constitutionality of the 
procedure that Washington Federal is attempting. If this Court declines to stay execution, the 
S The Van Engelens' case is stronger on this point because they would be robbed not merely from 
a meaningful appeal, but any appeal at all. 
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Federal from executing upon its judgment by foreclosing on that appeal as well. The Van 
Engelens) case is also stronger on the fourth point because they would be robbed not merely 
fi'om a meaningful appeal, but any appeal at all. With respect to the amount of the bond, a $6 
million bond for the Van Engelens is no less catastrophic for the Van Engelens than a $12 billion 
bond was for Texaco. In fact, it is worse for the Van Engelens. Texaco could have posted 
security for the $12 billion by fully collateralizing its assets. Texaco, 784 P.2d at 1138. The Van 
Engelens could not begin to post security even if they liquidated every asset they own. (See 
Affidavit ofH. Craig Van Engelen.) Finally, the fact that this personal catastrophe to the Van 
Engelens does not impact others on a global and national basis does not change their entitlement 
to due process, which is an individual right guaranteed by the Constitution. 
C. Good Cause Exists to Waive the Requirement of the Supersedeas Bond 
Washington Federal argues that the sworn affidavit of Craig Van Engelen about his 
financial condition is insufficient to demonstrate that the Van Enge1ens cannot afford the bond or 
other security which would forestall execution on the judgment. The Bank seems to argue that 
the Van Engelens must produce documentary evidence of their assets. Contrary to Washington 
Federal's argument, this affidavit is more than sufficient. First, it does not contain mere 
conclusory statements, but details the nature and extent of their liabilities as compared with their 
assets. He testified that their liabilities, including those owed to Washington Federal, exceed $20 
million (Affidavit ofH. Craig Van Engelen in Support of Motion to Waive Requirement of 
Supersedeas Bond and Stay Execution and/or Enforcement of the Judgment, filed July 6, 2011, 
at ~ 6-7). He further testified that they have liquidated most of their remaining business assets to 
satisfy other debts, that they have had no income for five yeru's, and that their liabilities far 
exceed their very limited rem~ining assets. (ld. at ~~ 5-9). He testified that they were unable to 
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qualify for a bond and could not post a cash deposit. (Jd. at ~, 10-11). A witness may testify to 
his personal knowledge. LR.E. 602. Mr. Van Engelen certainly has personal knowledge about 
whether the Van Engelens' liabilities exceed their assets and their inability to post security in the 
amount of to stay execution. There is no requirement that Mr. Van Engelen must submit 
documentary evidence to bolster his sworn testimony, although they will do so if that is the 
COUli'S preference. 
Finally, contrary to Washington Federal's contention otherwise, the Van Engelens' 
assertion that good cause exists for waiving the supersedeas bond and execution upon the 
judgment does not hinge solely on their inability to afford a supersedeas bond. (Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Waive Requirement of Supersedeas Bond and Stay 
Execution and/or Enforcement of the Judgment, p. 11.) Rather, good cause exists because they 
are unable to afford a supersedeas bond and, being thus unable to forestall execution on the 
judgment, are about to lose their right to appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, and the reasons stated in their earlier briefing, the Van Engelens 
request that this COUli waive the requirement of a supersedeas bond and stay execution andlor 
enforcement of the judgment. 
... ~\ 
DATED this ~ day of July 2011. 
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC 
~"'i~b~ ara Parker 
Attorneys fo Defendants 
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DEPUTY ES 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
WASHINGTON FEDERAL SAVINGS, a 
United States Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
H. CRAIG V AN ENGELEN and KRISTEN 
V AN ENGELEN, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-OC 0917209 
SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY IN 
SUPPORT OF THE VAN ENGELENS' 
MOTION TO WAIVE SUPERSEDEAS 
BOND AND/OR ENFORCEMENT OF 
THE JUDGMENT 
At the hearing conducted concerning the Van Engelens' Motion to Waive the 
Supersedeas Bond andlor Enforcement of Judgment, held on September 1,2011, the Court 
invited the parties to submit additional authority regarding the Court's statutolY authority to 
waive the supersedeas bond. The Van Engelens would like to take this opportunity to address 
two rules promulgated by the Idaho Supreme Court. As the Comt is aware, under Idaho Code 
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§ 13-202, "[t]he supersedeas bond or cash deposit requirements may also be waived in any action 
for good cause shown as provided by rule of the supreme court." The Supreme COUtt rules 
concerning supersedeas bonds are contained in Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 62(a) and Idaho 
Appellate Rule 13(b). 
A. J.R.C.P.62(a) 
The Court may wish to examine Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 62(a), which broadly 
provides that "[ e ]xecution or other proceedings to enforce a judgment may issue immediately 
upon the entry of judgment, unless the court in its discretion and on such conditions for the 
security ofthe adverse party as are proper, otherwise directs" (emphasis added). The COUlt of 
Appeals has interpreted this Rule a number of times. It has noted, for example, that "[aJ trial 
court possesses the authority to compel obedience to its orders ... and to direct the execution of 
ajudgment "on such conditions for the security of the adverse party as are proper." Merrill v. 
Gibson, 142 Idaho 692, 695, l32 P.3d 449, 452 (Ct. App. 2005) (citing LR.C.P. 62(a». Relative 
to this rule, the Court of Appeals has also said that "[tJhe power to stay the execution on a 
judgment rests within the discretion of the trial COUlt .... A stay of execution may be granted 
when it would be uniust to permit the execution on the iudgment, such as where there are 
equitable grounds for the stay or where celtain other proceedings are pending." Haley v. Clinton, 
123 Idaho 707, 709,851 P.2d 1003, 1005 (Ct. App. 1993). This rule suggests that the Comt has 
been given discretion by the Supreme Court to grant a stay of execution if execution would be 
unjust. As the COUlt knows, the Van Engelens contend that just such a situation exists here, 
where Washington Federal is attempting to execute on the right to appeal the judgment on which 
it is executing. 
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B. LA.R. 13(b)(8) 
The Van Engelens also direct the Court's attention to Idaho Appellate Rule 13(b)(8). 
Rule 13(b) addresses various motions that the district court may take up during the pendency of 
an appeal. Subsection (8) provides that the district court has the power to "[e]nter a stay of 
execution or enforcement of any injunction or mandatory order entered by the court upon such 
conditions and upon the posting of such security as the court determines in its discretion" 
(emphasis added). This expressly gives the court discretion to enter a stay of any order entered 
by the court on any terms it deems reasonable. That can be contrasted with subsection (15), 
which states that the COUlt has the power to enter a stay of a money judgment upon the posting of 
a supersedeas bond. Subsection (15) implies that when an appropriate supersedeas bond is 
posted, the stay should be granted as a matter of course. Notably, this subsection does not give 
the Court discretion when a supersedeas bond is posted. However, just because a Court should 
enter a stay when a supersedeas bond is posted under subsection (15) does not preclude its 
exercise of discretionary power to stay "any" order, as expressly stated by the Supreme Comi in 
subsection (8), upon terms that the district court believes are just. 
Based on either Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 62( a) or Idaho Appellate Rule 13(b )(8), 
the Court has statutory authority to waive the requirement of the supersedeas bond. 
DATED this 2nd day of September 2011. 
BANDUCCI WOODARD SCHWARTZMAN PLLC 
~~/~k 
ara Parkfr 
Attorneys Jor Defendants 
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